

SELF-DETERMINATION, SELF-GOVERNMENT, REGIONALIZATION, AUTONOMY

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In the „long 19th century” (1798-1914), when world-politics was done in Europe, apart from the Napoleonic Wars and the convulsions of 1848-49 and the German and Italian unification aspirations, three undecided questions and on and off conflicts fluttered the dovecots and stirred up the still waters of the post-1870’s “European consensus” from time to time: the Eastern or Balkan, the Polish and the Irish. What they all had in common were the subordinated peoples, living in multi-ethnic empires, fighting for emancipation and the progressive development of home rule, with the ultimate aim of the development and reconstruction of an independent nation-state.

As the result of the 1804 Serbian uprisings supported by the Russians both financially and with weapons, the autonomic Serbian principality had been founded within the Ottoman Empire¹ by 1835. The first breach on the wall of the Holy Alliance was caused by the Greek revolution and the re-establishment of independent statehood, with English and French contribution, but on a good deal smaller territory than present day’s (Attica, Peloponnesus). The majority of the territories inhabited by the Bulgarians got liberated only in the bloody Russian-Turkish War (1877-1878). The unification-self-dependence process of the Danube Principality – which had an autonomic state within the Ottoman Empire – only got emphasis during the Crimean War (1853-55). The autonomy of the Serbian, Romanian, Bulgarian nation-states, together with the independence of Montenegro/ Crna Gora were acknowledged by the Berlin Congress (1878). Therefore, in these cases² autonomy proved to be the first step towards quitting a multi-ethnic empire.³

The Polish, who were divided in three different empires, were trying to restore their sovereign statehood by uprisings against the Russians over and over again between 1793 and 1863-1865. Between 1815 and 1831 Russian Poland possessed extensive autonomy, just as well as Austrian-Galicia after 1868. Based on that H. Wickham-Steed and R. W. Seton-Watson – who played an important role in the preparation of the Treaty of Versailles – regarded them as one of the five ruling “races” (German-Austrian, Hungarian, Croatian, Polish and Jewish) of the Monarchy. The Irish home rule aspirations⁴ were taken up by the liberal government of Gladstone from the 1880’s.⁵ The peaceful and bloody struggles (1916, Eastern Riot, Black and Tans, 1919-1921) were ended by the formation of the Southern Irish State⁶ and the separation of Northern Ireland, being supported significantly by the government of the United States and the influential Irish lobby. Being out of accord with common belief, the autonomy of peoples were not announced and put into practice by President Wilson, but Lenin, by acknowledging the separation of Poland and Finland. One of the peace points (the 10th) of the American president – to which the founders and supporters of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia refer by choice – aimed nothing more than ...” the assurance of the autonomic development of the peoples of Austria-Hungary.” Between the two world wars the victorious (Western) powers and their smaller allies had a share in the maintenance of the status quo, hence the principle of autonomy could only prevail among less significant, local referendums and territory alterations.⁷ After the Second World War only the autonomy that developed as the result of the liberation movements of the colonized people is acknowledged, until present day. Thus it cannot be put across as against a UNO country - The principle of the inviolability of the borders excludes the vindication of any other principles. Accepting this exigency was the principle of internal and external self-determination set out. The former means separation and the formation of a new state following

the lead of the previously mentioned European and overseas countries, which had already fought their independence – just like in the case of the posterior countries of the late federal states (the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia). On the other hand interior autonomy respects the sovereignty and the territorial integrity/unity of the given state, but demands personal-cultural and/or territorial autonomy for an ethnical, linguistic, religious minority, which - in certain situations – regards itself as a fellow nation of state foundation (the Swedish of Finland, Ukrainian and Latvian Russians, Slovakian and Romanian Hungarians), minority nation (Catalans), national community (Moldavian Gagauzes, the Serbians of Cosovo).⁸ “A ghost has been and is wandering in Central-Eastern Europe, the ghost of the claim for national self-determination.” – was stated by Csaba Tabajdi in 1993, at the peak of Yugoslavian inheritance or internecine war. Just like George Schöpflin he regards *home rule as the most important and determining element of self-determination and autonomy*. Home rule is more acceptable for the common opinion of the West, both because of historical and psychological reasons – our experts and European delegates admonish us – as the word and demand “autonomy” is often connected unconsciously with or without a reason with the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia, and thus we tend to use it as its synonym. Quoting Tabajdi “... exterior self-determination... is the right to separate, that came up against state sovereignty. (Hence) ... it is only expedient for the national and ethnical minorities to make use of internal autonomy, so they would not jeopardize territorial integrity or induce conflicts of unforeseeable consequences... There is a need for limited national autonomy and also for self-limitation, or in other words introspective limitation of sovereignty by the state. As an accomplished, exemplary solution he is mentioning “the autonomous status of Southern Tirol”.⁹

The preconditions of the practical realization of home rule are devolution and power-sharing. For this the labour-party government of Great Britain set a good example (Scottish, Welsh referendums, local parliaments, governments: Good Friday Agreement with Northern Ireland). Scotland got the furthestmost by developing the historical distinctions (legal system, church-organization): apart from foreign affairs, armed forces, immigration-citizenship, energy supply and diffusion all state and local cases fall within the cognizance of the Edinburgh parliament and government (executive power).

Devolution and decentralization lead to the term of *region* by all odds. We do not wish to discuss neither the macroregions exceeding state level (Scandinavia, the Central European region covering the former states of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the mediterranean Southern Europe) hereby, nor the (euro) regions¹⁰ outreaching the borders. The microregions (in many instances the ancient territory of an ethnical-lingual-cultural minority, where it forms a majority, thus *etnoregions*) are sub state, namely they are under the level of the sovereignty the national state.¹¹ *Regionalism* is an overhand, bottom-up process, organised to obtain bigger margin and self-determination within the state (self-governance, self-rule), while regionalisation is a top-down decentralization trending from top to bottom, during which “...administrative, political, educational and economical competencies are given over to sub-state levels by the central power.”¹² Regionalism fights for establishing wider ethnocultural, political, and economic autonomy, and regionalization “... very often evolves when the international and native legitimacy of the state weakens or collapses.”¹³ Rudolf Joó points out the connection between the elimination of the colonial system and the starting-strengthening regional movements of the mother-country.¹⁴ A regionalized state takes after a federative state from lots of aspects. It is a system in which the legislative and executive bodies organize on the level of the central state and certain entities. Most often the division of power is uneven. ¹⁵ The 1334/2003 regulation of the Council of Europe based on the Gross Report defines autonomy as “... sub-state agreement, which allows the cultural congeniality of the minorities while providing stable guarantees in point of the unity, sovereignty and territorial integration of the state... The phase cultural autonomy refers to the permit of the practice of lingual and cultural rights. In most cases it can concur with the utilization of the principle of decentralization. The phase territorial autonomy is used to describe systems established within sovereign states, through which the inhabitants of a certain territory gain a wider range of authorities. These authorities reflect their specific territorial situation, safeguard and promote their cultural and religious habits. By this the impartibility of the state can be reconciled with autonomy, regionalism or federalism. ¹⁶ The autonomous status has to be developed always according to the certain territory’s geographical, historical and cultural circumstances, and the characteristics of specific cases and conflict zones¹⁷. The agreements concerning the autonomous state have to provide that the autonomous entity possesses local, democratically elected legislative and executive authorities. These agreements have to provide funds and/or transfers which allow autonomous authorities to practice power bestowed upon them by the central state... The agreements concerning the autonomous status have to provide proportional representation and efficient participation in decision-making and the management of public affairs for the authority.”... The autonomy based solutions has to be regarded as sub-state arrangements in favour of a certain part of population. Successful autonomy

depends on the balanced relations (system of relationships) between majority and minority, as well as relations between ethnic groups within the state. The autonomous status always has to respect the principles of equality and non-discrimination.” Detailed case-studies analyse the long historic road leading towards the establishment of autonomous constructions, constitution alterations, the judicial-legal frameworks of certain autonomies, the materialization and exercise of the right of external and internal self-determination, but also the differences. South Tirol comes first from every aspect, followed by the island-autonomies (Åland, Feröer, Greenland), the Spanish autonomous communities (Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia), the Moldavian Gagauzia with its “... specific status of territorial autonomy” and the Crimean Autonomous Republic, which is “...an autonomous administrative territorial entity within Ukraine.”¹⁸ When analysing the operation of autonomous entities, the federal state organizations are emphasized, with Switzerland being the most perfect, followed by Germany, Austria, and Belgium. Canada, Spain, and for more over Great Britain have started their way towards becoming a federal state: “... the system of devolution, which is mainly used in the United Kingdom, results in a high level of decentralization, which leads to a new form of regional state.”¹⁹ The leader of the Spanish People’s Party, Mariano Rajoy stated in 2006: “...Spain has become the most decentralized states of the world within a short period of time. It is a system hard to define, approaching the federal structure.” The 2006 autonomy-statutum allowed Catalonia to open – just like Scotland - representative office in Brussels.

Experts fully agree concerning that there is no autonomy-system that can be used everywhere and anytime, and that can ultimately solve every majority - minority problems. “... Autonomy is not a cure-all, and the solutions offered/given by it are not generally adaptable and cannot be used universally.”²⁰ Let us have a look at the two best operating autonomy-models: in South Tirol the armed forces (police – gendarmerie – military) are under the control of the central Roman government and their language is Italian; 90% of the taxes and incomes stay within the province, and only 10% flows into central budget. In Catalonia (and in Basque Country and Galicia) police is controlled by the autonomous authorities, and accordingly their language is Catalan, Basque and Gallego, but 50% of the taxes and other incomes (by other sources 70%) flow in the common budget in Madrid – the autonomous legislative bodies and state organizations have been struggling for reducing it for years.²¹

One of the many definitions of autonomy can be found in the review of the 1334/2003 resolution of the Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, based on the Gross Report: “... Autonomy can be regarded as a solution within the state, which allows the minority to practice their rights and reserve their cultural identity, while offering certain guarantees for the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. Thus autonomy, regionalism and federalism become reconcilable with the impartibility of the state... Autonomy cannot lead to the alteration of borders.” The Assembly requested the member states to respect the recommendations summarized in 9 points, among which it is stated, that the system of autonomy has to be created by mutual consent, along with the undisturbed operation of the local government of the territory and the funds needed for that, and the involvement in the central government’s decisions.²² “... The aspiration of autonomy is strong where the determining characteristic of the regional groups is difference in a lingual, racial, religious, cultural and social structural sense”²³, therefore in the so called ethnoregions. A part of these ethnoregions possessed independent statehood in the Middle Ages, until the centralization of the New Age.²⁴ Hereby we can only refer to the Adreanum of 1224, which provided territorial, cultural, and later religious autonomy for the Transylvanian Saxons, the privileged legal status of the Cumans and later the heyducks based on territorial autonomy, the Borderlands between 1690 and 1872, which provided so to say territorial and cultural autonomy for the Serbians, the fellow status of Croatia, with ultimate home rule from 1868, with Croatian tongued administration, police and armed units, (Catholic) religious autonomy, to which the situation of the Galician Polish was similar in the last decades of the Monarchy.²⁵

It is indisputable that there is a close connection between minorities-minority protection and autonomy, and also that the question of autonomy became acutely actual (again)²⁶ during the period of the partition of the Soviet Union and the Southern-Slavic Wars, and was regarded – only for a short time, unfortunately – as a possible solution for the international conflicts.²⁷

The Carrington Plan of October 1991 - which offered the last acceptable solution for keeping the unity of Yugoslavia - would have provided a far-reaching territorial-administrative-police autonomy for the Serbians of Croatia, but it was disapproved by the militarily advancing Milošević government, that chased the dream of Great Serbia. The Carrington Plan served as a basis for present day’s most accurately elaborated three-step autonomy-draft of the Hungarians of Vojvodina, accepted in April 1992 by the “historic” Democratic Community of the Hungarians of Vojvodina, which would have provided:

a.) personal-cultural autonomy (similar to the autonomy of the church)

b.) local government

c.) territorial autonomy for the Hungarians in those settlements (town and agglomeration) where they were in majority.

Naturally all the other Hungarian minorities of the Carpathian Basin developed their own autonomy-drafts. They were based on Romanian-Transylvanian and Slovakian fellow nation-conception, and they also have it in common that "... the neighbouring local, self-governing autonomies (local governments – AL) can associate to form regional local self-governing autonomies..." On the 25th October 1992 the National Council of the Envoys of the Romanian Hungarian Democratic Association announced its claim for autonomy based on internal self-determination²⁸ in the Declaration of Kolozsvár. In January 1993 the Congress of Brasov added it to the program of the party; the personal-cultural autonomy was supplemented with the claim of territorial, political autonomy on those territories, where Hungarians make up the majority of the population. An autonomy-commission was set up, which developed a four-state layout, from which only some points of the personal principled autonomy-constitution – based on gentilic register – were accepted in 1995. Nevertheless from then on most of the politicians of the Romanian Hungarian Democratic Association identify themselves with the case of autonomy only in declarations (mainly during electioneering); in their practical politics, and putting their interests across they use the tactics of "small steps", by cooperating with Romanian parties, and taking up roles in the government from time to time. The radical, confrontational "internal opposition" of the Romanian Hungarian Democratic Association established the Sekler National Council and the Transylvanian Hungarian National Council. The former fights for the territorial autonomy of Sekler Country in the first place, while the latter is trying to materialize the personal autonomy of the Hungarians living out of the Sekler block. In 2004 the Romanian Hungarian Democratic Association group of representatives handed in the autonomy-draft worked out by dr. József Csapó in the Bucarest house of commons, which was not discussed. The reason is simple: the Romanian politicians and also the general opinion – in total concert with the Slovakian – are concerned that decentralization and regionalization necessarily leads to partition.

On a political field the case of autonomy would be carried on by the Hungarian Civic Party and Transylvanian Hungarian People's Party. The Romanian Hungarian Democratic Association is trying to manoeuvre by making the best of regionalization: instead of the present 8²⁹ developmental regions they would divide the country into 15-16 more competitive regions, out of which one would be Harghita, the Sekler Land ethno region from Kovászna county and at least the Hungarian inhabited part of Maros county. As interesting news, at the geographical institute of the Christian University of the Partium layouts are being worked out about the establishment of an ethno region at Érmellék, clinging to Hungary. The Hungarian ambassador of Bucarest stated in an interview given to one of the Romanian channels in May 2012: autonomy is the only logical and natural compromise between the territorial sovereignty of the national majority and the minorities' right of existence, and – as a reassurance – he added: one who yields autonomy, does not want to leave, but wants to stay where he is.³⁰

In (Czecho)Slovakia every Hungarian party (Együttélés, Hungarian Civic Party, Christian Democratic Movement³¹) has worked out his own autonomy-draft, which all had in common the aspiration aiming the association of the local governments of the Hungarian majority Southern Slovakian regions. The Slovakian government opens the door to that.³³ In 1991 there were 435 Hungarian majority settlements in the region. If this right of association could have prevailed in practice, a 600 km long, almost coherent Hungarian majority kraj stretching from Bratislava until Uzhhorod could have developed during the territorial-administrative realignment of the country. Joinder started: "The Association of the Towns and Villages of Csallóköz" was a registered organisation, and other associations were preparing to do so as well. The peak that has not been exceeded since then was at the governmental general assembly of Komarno in January 1994, with 3000 mayors and representatives. They set out two variants for the formation of a "coherent administrative unit" with Hungarian majority: A, which has already been mentioned, would have meant belt between the state and language border, and B would have prevised three units: from Bratislava until the Ipoly Region, from the Ipoly Region until Kosice, and the Southern Zemplén-Ung unit. As seats Komarno and Nové Zámky could have been taken into account. The declaration evoked a hysterical reaction from the Slovakian political elite and the general opinion³⁶, as they saw the open announcement of the intention to secede; it is understood thing that in all layers of the Slovakian society and also in the political parties there is a paranoiac fear of the unrealistic possibility of the 1938 First Vienna Award to happen again. Between 1998 and 2006 the Hungarian Coalition Party was an important factor of the government. The price of getting into – inter alia – was to give up the claim for all forms of autonomy. The administrative reform worked out during the Mečiar Era was put into practice by the government of Dzúrinda – the Hungarian Coalition Party, who was in power, could not prevent the coherent and most populated Hungarian block in the South-West to be torn

into three parts, making it impossible to form even relative majority of Hungarians in any of the great counties. A similar “result” was achieved by the church by increasing the number of dioceses and by “retailoring” them.

Subcarpathia – which belonged to Czechoslovakia between the two world wars – became the westernmost county of the (newly) forming Ukraine after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The autonomy aspirations supported by the autochthon Rusins – just like in Vojvodina – were formulated in a double space: at the referendum of December 1991 78% of the inhabitants voted for the territorial unity of the whole of Subcarpathia.³⁷ The Subcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Association, who undertook the representation of the interest of the Hungarians has proposed a proposal about the principles of the Subcarpathian Hungarian autonomy in 1991, with the organization of the Hungarian inhabited settlements into an administrative unit based on self-determination, within the politically and economically autonomous Subcarpathia. Even a bill had been made about the “Hungarian gentile district of Beregszász”, but it has never become a case at issue in the parliament of Kiev.³⁸ In 1999 the Subcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Association showed up with a new draft about the establishment and actuation of a gentile cultural local government and independent educational district and also about the organization of the Tisza-mellék district, with Beregszász as seat.³⁹ The Ukrainian constitution accepted in 1996 only accepts cultural - lingual autonomy; even so the Crimean Autonomous Republic exists – out of historical-ethnic-political pressure -, but it is considered to be a specific and unrepeatable solution. According to the 1997 governmental law the Association of the Governments of the Subcarpathian Borderline can operate thanks to Hungarian self-organization, for the representation of the interest of the local communities, and for the improvement of their transborder relationships.

Besides Subcarpathia the solution of double citizenship was also introduced in Transylvania –as an alternative.⁴⁰ Gyurcsány and his government practiced antinational politics on this field as well: he supported against double citizenship before the 2004 referendum of evil memory; in 2007 János Kóka stated: the autonomy of Transylvania is not an actual case, and according to its president the support of Hungary is not helping, but harm the autonomy aspirations worked out by the transborder Hungarian communities. After the fall of the Milošević system the (territorial) autonomy of Vojvodina has been partially restored, and the National Councils of the minorities could form. From 2002 the Hungarian National Council took over governmental licences on the fields of education, public civilization, mass media and language usage. Hypothetically it means ultimate personal-cultural autonomy, only in the Carpathian Basin. The biggest obstacle of successful operation is that the province did not get back its economic independence, and the central budget does not provide the necessary financial funds. For more over the 2012 decision of the Serbian constitutional court practically eliminates the autonomy of Vojvodina, and hamstring the operation of the National Councils.

About autonomy in general as a summary: “... Autonomy is... when a group takes the administration of its own cases in its hands, along with the establishment of its legal and institutional conditions. ... The autonomy of a person... cannot be validated without the existence of collective rights and the autonomy of groups... Territorial autonomy can form where minority is in majority on a certain bigger, coherent territory, and on this territory – in accordance to the state jurisdiction – it can establish its own administration, can actuate independent decision-making, executional, judicial bodies, regulate and control the educational and cultural life of the given territory.”⁴¹

“... For people and communities who aspire to conserve national identity autonomy is of vital interest; autonomy is the most complex collective right of the widest range of authority, the guarantee of the ultimate equality of the citizen, and getting through the scopes of authority to the representative of the communities.”

⁴² According to Miklós Duray: “... it is the system of the mutually restricted sovereignty.”⁴³ The local governments of special status serve decentralized state administration and specifically minority cases at the same time. The phrase autonomy is also used to describe the local governments of special status established in terms of decentralization covering codifying scopes of authority. We can talk about autonomy in a legal sense if certain territories or groups of people can govern themselves according to their own laws, through their own institutions. Thus the right of autonomy is a collective right. “... If autonomy leads to the acceptance of the minority as state-forming nation or fellow nation, and the democratic governing materializes, it will be the strongest warrant against secession.”⁴⁴ “... Those territories can be named as self-governing or autonomous regions, where local population has the right and legal opportunity to control its own cases and establish its own institutions. ... Majority population has to consider autonomy as a possible solution; nevertheless the minority group cannot endanger the territorial integrity of the state who provides its autonomy. ... Autonomy means the most effective frame for the assurance of minority rights.”⁴⁵ “... The cultural, personal, and finally the territorial autonomy is an inevitable condition for the conservation of the

Hungarian minority... but it can only be initiated by the compromise between the majority and the minority. For this the support of the mother country is needed by all means.”⁴⁶ “... The Hungarian government must make use of every possible opportunities and tools in order to make Serbia and Ukraine settle the legal situation of the Hungarian communities, including the assurance of their autonomy before joining the European Union... The members of the Hungarian Autonomy Council of the Carpathian Basin find the system of public autonomies competent to solve the problems of the Hungarian minority communities. ... The aligned and strict representation of the claim for the establishment of public autonomies is an important part of the Hungarian national strategy.⁴⁷ – this is the consistently represented position of the Orbán government, apart from the assurance of preferential nationalization/double citizenship of the order of hundreds of thousands.

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In view of the struggling road towards the establishment of operating autonomies what are the chances of the formation of the Hungarian minority autonomy in the Carpathian Basin? Both the close-up and the picture of the far future are more than dim. The most comprehensive autonomy of Åland is not an example that could be followed, as here we lack the island-character and internationally guaranteed demilitarized state. We also lack multiple conditions of the closest considered solution of South Tyrol: Hungary does not have an internationally acknowledged protectorate status (Schutzmacht) like Austria does; there is no unified Hungarian body of representation of interests, political party, like the Peoples Party of South Tyrol; the elimination of mutual fear and mistrust is missing, just like tolerance and understanding from the side of the majority, and trust from the side of the minority. We cannot expect international pressure and/or support, like it happened in the case of the autonomy of the Gagauz people of Moldova, which was supported both by Russia and Turkey. Moreover the primary problem of the Chişinău government were not the Gagauz people, but the nonconformist Transnistria, maintained by Russian armed force – on the other hand in Romania, Slovakia and Serbia the Hungarians demand for autonomy is concerned as the biggest danger for the safety and territorial integrity of the state. In this case we cannot expect international support, but rather resistance, as the entente-reflexes are still alight: the post-war status quo has to be maintained by any means, against the ultimate peace-breaker (or what is more fascist) Hungarians (Germans, Croatians) – the Beneš Decrees, which are in practice this very day serve as a good example...

Summary

Self-determination can be external, leading to secession and the formation an own national state, or internal, which provides local government, personal-cultural and/or territorial autonomy for a national (ethnic, lingual, religious) minority within the state of the majority, whose sovereignty, territorial integrity does not disintegrate. The most important, determining element of self-determination and autonomy is self-government: self-rule, home-rule, self-governance (György Schöpflin). The ways of materialization: decentralization, the separation of powers, the dissimilation of powers: power-sharing, devolution, regionalization, federal state organization (Switzerland, Belgium, Canada). The definition of autonomy of the Council of Europe based on the 2003 Gross Report: “...Autonomy can be regarded as a solution within the state, which allows the minority to practice their rights and reserve their cultural identity, while offering certain guarantees for the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. Thus autonomy and regionalism become reconcilable with the impartibility of the state.”

The most successfully operating island - autonomies are: Åland, Feröer, Grönland, and also Southern Tyrol, Catalonia and Gagauz Country in Moldavia, but there is no principle of organization or practice that could be used everywhere. However there is a need for the majorities and minorities – it is shown by the historical examples – to be able to make compromises, and also for tolerance, understanding and trust from both sides: the social-political integrity of the minority and the support of the mother country. Being aware of all these things there is small chance for the Hungarian autonomy-aspirations of the Carpathian Basin to come true.

Translated by Zsófia Csuti

References

1 The Turkish garrisons were only depleted of troops only in 1867 in four important castles, thus from Belgrade.

2 From 1870 Bulgarian exarchate had come into action

3 It is a lesser-known fact, that the century-long successful millet-system of the Ottoman Empire did not only mean ecclesiastic-cultural-educational self-government, but also to complete governmental tasks (tax-collection), hence it can be regarded as a form of autonomy. For more over: during the establishment of the sanjaks the ethnical-religious distribution was taken into consideration: for example on the land of today's Iraq there were ones of Kurdish (Mosul), Sunni (Bagdad) and Shia (Basrah) majority – what is that, if not a sort of territorial autonomy?

4 Which curiously started with Protestant leadership (Parnell)

5 After the Irish under-secretary had been chopped up with a lancet along with his secretary in a Dublin park in 1882

6 Complete independence was obtained only in 1949.

7 Silesian, Masurian, Schleswigian, Carinthian, of Sopron, but not in the case of the Åland Islands

8 According to the right of external autonomy it is the right of the people (nation, nationality, ethnic group) to determine its state affiliation, international and constitutional legal status; the right of a community developed into a state to internationally practice independence and sovereignty. By the right of internal autonomy it is the autonomous right of a people which is not in majority and not dominant (nation, nationality, ethnic group) to control its political, economic and cultural issues within the bounds of the state. In essence it agrees with the (personal and territorial self-governing) system of ethnical-gentilic community/collective rights. Rudolf Joó after Heinz Kloss: *Nemzeti és nemzetiségi önrendelkezés, önkormányzat, egyenjogúság*. Kossuth Bp. 1984 pages 28-29.

9 Tabajdi Csaba: *Az önazonosság labirintusa* Bp. 1998 CP Stúdió pages 548., 551-552.

10 Although some of them, like the Basel-centered Alleman and Silezia can fall under the head of our examination as ethnoregions

11 Gruber Károly: *Európai identitások: régió, nemzet, integráció*. Pro Minoritate-Osiris-BIP, Bp. 2002 page 40.

12 *ibid*

13 *ibid* pages 42, 46

14 *Etnikumok és regionalizmus Nyugat-Európában*, Gondolat, Bp. 1988

15 The Gross Report: Positive experiences of autonomous regions as a source of inspiration for conflict resolution in Europe 3 June 2003 *Foreign Policy Review* 2003/2 p. 116

16 But at the same time it states: „... It is undeniable that autonomy is a phase with a negative subsidiary meaning. It may seem as an intimidation for the integration of states, a step towards separation, but most often only few facts prove this point of view.

17 The question of Abhasia, South Ossetia, Cosovo, Chechnya and Transnistria are of high priority, discussed through several pages.

The Gross Report pp 102., 125-128.

18 *ibid* pp 104-105

19 *ibid* pp 115-117

20 *ibid* p 99

21 *Az európai autonómia formák tapasztalatai*. In: *Pro minoritate Europae – Az európai kisebbségekért* edit. Tabajdi Csaba EU-Ground Kft 2009. p 221., p 243.

22 Éva Zabolai Csekme: *Nemzetiség-önrendelkezés Háromszék*, 18th April 2007

23 L.R. Watts: *Federalism, Regionalism, and Political Integration* 1981 p6

24 Scotland, Aragon-Catalonia, Navarra-Basque Country, Bretagne

25 More about this: József Hévízi: *Autonómia-típusok Magyarországon és Európában* Püski, Bp. 2001

26 The peace treaties sealing the First World War prevised three autonomies: Subcarpathia (Rusinsko) in Czechoslovakia, the autonomy of the Saxons and Seklers in Romania, and the autonomy of the vlachs of Pindos in Greece. Out of all these – partially and tardily – only the Subcarpathian could come into existence in 1938-39; the similar Hungarian concept of Teleki-Kozma could not materialize because of the war.

27 „One of the possible means to materialize the protection of the national minorities' ethnical cultural and religious identity...is to create local or autonomous administration based on the specific historical and territorial circumstances of these certain minorities...according to the politics of the concerned state. OSCE, Copenhagen, June 1990 “...On those territories, regions, where people belonging to the national minority are in majority, these people should have the right to possess local or autonomous administration, local government and special status, in pursuance of their historical and territorial status and in accordance to the internal laws of the state.” 1201/1993 Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

28 "... Which does not aim territorial partition, but includes all those forms of autonomy, which guarantee the local government of settlements... and correspond with the moral of the international documents." Memorandum about the internal autonomy of the Romanian Hungarian national community, Romanian Hungarian Democratic Association, 31st December 1992, dr. József Csapó

29 The so called "Middle" region, that covers 6 counties, is an artificial formation, leaving all aspects out of account: apart from the three Sekler counties, the most improved Brasov belongs there, just like Szeben and Fehér; its seat is Gyulaféhevár (Alba Julia) on the Western borders, far from everything. Due to its improvement and economy it gets fewer funds to develop, but almost the whole of it is helping the Romanian inhabited counties. Mainly the leeway on infrastructural investments threatens the more and more seceding Hungarian inhabited areas.

30 Krónika, 16th May 2012

31 Due to outer pressure, in order to get into the parliament, they united under the name of The Party of Hungarian Coalition in 1998

32 Of Csallóköz, Mátyusföld, Ipolymente, Dél-Gömör, Bogrogköz

33 "The civil parish has the right to associate with other civil parishes for the sake of cases representing common interest." 66.§

34 With two smaller breaks in Hont-Nógrád and Zemplén

35 District, great-county

36 László Szarka: Az 1990-es évtized szlovákiai magyar autonómiatervei 1998 (manuscript)

37 Later it softened to "special governmental administrative territory" (bill of March 1992), due to the pressure of Kiev

38 Like the one which prevised the "Specific Economic Belt of Subcarpathia", which was greeted with eager hopes both by the local governments and foreign investors.

39 It would have included the settlements of the neighbouring Uzhhorod, Mukacheve, Nagyszöllős districts, and by this a 20km wide Hungarian autonomous belt would have formed from Csap until the Nevetlenfalu of Ugocsa. In the draft the claim for the assurance of double citizenship was published, although there is no legal opportunity for that in Ukraine, regarding the Russian population of millions.

40 Dr. Csapó József: A belső önrendelkezéstől a kettős állampolgárságig (kézirat) 2001

41 Tabajdi: i.m. pp 554-556.

42 Csapó 2001

43 A társnemzeti viszony kialakításának szükségszerúsége (manuscript) 1993

44 Dr. Balogh Sándor: Autonómia és az új világrend MVSZ Bp. 2008. p 138.

45 Az európai autonómiaformák tapasztalatai ... pp 242., 244., 247.

46 Vienna Journal, March-April 2009.

47 The disclosure of the Hungarian Autonomy Council of the Carpathian Basin, Vienna Journal, May-June 2009.

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Thank you for your kind collaboration. *Editor-in-Chief*