

ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Abstract

Religious ethics have accommodated in their own way with the reality that humans leave simultaneously in different spheres of life [*Lebensordnungen*], each of which is subject to specific laws, Max Weber remarked in a lecture given in 1919. In other words, one ethics applies to the state as the highest concentration of politics and those who represent the state, and other rules are relevant to interpersonal relations. Violence employed by the state comes under a different legal regime and moral judgment, than that used by one individual against the other. By the end of the 17th century and in the first part of the next, the two overlapped significantly, though war continued to be the exceptional situation in which special rules were valid. An international universal morality developed in Europe, destroyed in the course of the 19th century by nationalistic universalism. Some nations had a mission, others, smaller had only fate they could only contemplate. With the new technological civilization of the 21st century, based on genetics, nanotechnologies and robotics (GNR), old rules do have a more and more restricted application. According to some, the new rule is that there is no rule at all.

Keywords: ethics, international, surveillance society, warrior machines, cyber warfare, unrestricted warfare.

OUTLINE OF THE ARTICLE

Unrestricted war
Warrior machines
Surveillance society
War in the 21st century
A few final remarks

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Ever since organized groups employed violence against each other to resolve conflicts that could not be solved by other means, there have been rules on the conduct in times of war and the ways armed force was used. Plenty of them are to be found in the Iliad, the Bhagavad Gita, and other ancient texts. The first systematic summary is in the *Art of War* by Sun-tzu, a 2500 years' old text studied worldwide until these days.

Ethics in international relations, i.e. in relations between states initially was mainly about the rules of war. Mainly, because the institution of envoys and other interactions among political units had also their own customs, some of which had a moral dimension. "War, in Carl von Clausewitz's classic formula, is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means." (CLAUSEWITZ 1989, 605) His

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system of thinking made a clear distinction between the government, the army and the civilian population. Wars of the era (the 18th century essentially, because as a mentality he was a man of that century), were usually limited in scope and duration, soldiers too expensive to train to just be used as cannon fodder, and there have been a number of other conditions that made his assertion plausible. But after all, there was an interstate system, an embryonic international society, and the regular intercourse between their members was called politics.

In such conditions war, together with diplomacy was considered an institution of relations between monarchs and their states. (Wight 1995, 111) War as an institution begins with a declaration of war, followed usually by battle at the end of which the parties acknowledge who is the victor and the defeated. There must be a consensus on what victory means: for example the laying down of arms, capitulation, or other ways and acts indicating a clear admission of defeat. Once surrender occurs, violence must cease. Soldiers who killed enemy soldiers shall not be considered criminals under penal law, and killings are not regarded murders. Civilians must be protected and unnecessary destruction shall be avoided. It is evident that these rules override the precepts of personal ethics, especially the Sixth commandment “Thou shall not kill!” (Exodus 20:13)

Christian doctrine, from St. Augustine onwards, has consolidated by the end of the Middle Ages a coherent *corpus* on war and warfare, with its main element: the just war theory. The *jus in bello* has developed in the 20th century into what we call humanitarian law, while since the 1990s the issue of *jus ad bellum*, the right to use military force in other conditions than self-defense is again at the forefront of debates on ethics and international affairs.

In this brief essay I propose to take war as an institution of relations between organized political units, the standard against which all other ongoing, or future armed conflicts shall be measured. Regardless of the fact, that in its pure form the “institution of war”, a specific activity governed by rules that are indeed observed occurred on an exceptional basis in human history.

When addressing various situations, without precedent in known history, created roughly over the past decade and a half by extraordinary advances in artificial intelligence, robotics, nanotechnology, and biotechnology, it is advisable to remind one of Max Weber’s remarks he made in his lecture on *Politics as vocation*. A depressed man on the edge of nervous breakdown, a patriot and a citizen of a country defeated and humiliated, with no good outcome in sight, he exclaimed in 1919:

How could a power that is said to be both omnipotent and good create such an irrational world of unmerited suffering, unpunished injustice, and incorrigible stupidity? Either that power is not omnipotent or it is not good, or else—a third possibility—life is governed by completely different principles of compensation and retribution, principles that we can interpret metaphysically or that are destined always to elude our attempts at interpretation. This problem, the experience of the irrationality of the universe, has always been the driving force of the entire history of religion. The Indian doctrine of karma, Persian dualism, original sin, predestination, and the *deus absconditus* have all grown out of this experience. The early Christians, too, were well aware that the world was governed by demons and that whoever becomes involved with politics, that is to say, with power and violence as a means, has made a pact with satanic powers. It follows that as far as a person’s actions are concerned, it is not true that nothing but good comes from good and nothing but evil from evil, but rather quite frequently the opposite is the case. Anyone who does not realize this is in fact a mere child in political matters. (WEBER 2004, 86)

Ethics has been extended in second half the past century far beyond the laws of war, challenging daily policy makers of all ranks, journalists and the individual citizen, whether at nation-state, or transnational levels.

Let us have no illusions: international politics has not become more ethical as it used to be before. It is the increasing power of moral judgments on politics and their appeal to the public that have an increasing impact. To name a few domains: the ethics of foreign policy making (meaning mainly the claim of publicity and democratic control), human rights, the responsibility to protect the weak by the use of force (called also humanitarian intervention), the morality of international economic sanctions against states (hitting hard innocent citizens, but not the leaders, whose politics triggered the sanctions).

The quest for democracy and self-determination at the beginning of the 21st century brought up an entire class of questions and problems, known for a long time, but seemingly insurmountable in an environment in which too many parties have a stake, or want to interfere in the process. In the following lines I will address only a few of the most recent and pressing questions, debates in the media and the academia, non-governmental organizations and governments, of direct interest for all of us.

Unrestricted war

Warfare in the 21st century continues to be a determinant feature of mankind. “The distinction between war and peace is the foundation of civilized life”, as Martin Wight summarized it briefly. (Wight 1995, 141) Is this still a valid statement? Techniques and weaponry belonging to five generations of warfare are simultaneously used and abused by governments, non-state actors, organized crime, warlords of all sort, or just furious civilians, hacktivists or the professional revolutionaries of the time.

Two Chinese military officers published in 1999 a book entitled „*Unrestricted Warfare*”, maintaining, among others, that “If this name becomes established, this kind of war means that all means will be in readiness that information will be omnipresent, and the battlefield will be everywhere.” The rule is that there is no rule. The authors also wrote,

If we acknowledge that the new principles of war are no longer ‘using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will,’ but rather are ‘using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.’ (Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui 1999)ⁱ

In other words, this is not only unrestricted, but also undeclared and perpetual warfare. When these thoughts were put on paper, the potentials in new technologies, such as artificial intelligence, nano- and biotechnologies have only been contemplated, while what we have now in information technologies (IT) was estimated to become reality at a later stage. Information warfare meant primarily collection of tactical information, ensuring their accuracy, manipulation of the enemy and the public at large by various means of communications, and all other forms of handling tactical and strategic information and communication at an enhanced level, in comparing with the previous decades. The internet was not yet as developed as today. The school of thinking promoting the idea that low intensity arm conflicts, or total insurgencies or Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), or “network warfare” (term coined by John Arquila) will dominate the stage had many adherents.

The Chinese authors did not put forward something never heard before; it is well known that Sun-Tzu was mandatory reading not only in the military but also in many business schools, based on the idea that the world economy and transnational trade, including finance, are a battlefield where strategic thinking is vital, and non-lethal means are as important as force. The wording to make someone to submit “to your interest”, instead to your will, as in Clausewitz, has a specific meaning and message. Which aspirant superpower would not dream about Sun-tzu’s most important and widely quoted maxim:

In general, the method for employing the military is this: Preserving the [enemy’s] capital is best, destroying their state capital second-best. Preserving their army is best, destroying their army second-best. (...) For this reason attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence. (Sun-Tzu 1974, 177)

To attain this degree of excellence requires a total strategy and appropriate tools, within the *milieu* as defined by the Chinese officers, that once revealed and deployed compels anyone into submission by their mere existence. At the moment it is only one state that came close to this state of affairs, and that is not China.

Warrior machines

Technological advance was usually spearheaded by military technologies. The most spectacular developments, capturing imagination and causing thrills everywhere are taking place in this field. No wonder about the publicity such technologies enjoy, including the wildest exaggerations sometimes. In other cases some aspects are downplayed or considered so abstract that do not receive the attention they deserve.

No question, one of the hottest emerging topics in these days is the morality of using in warfare, or during internal political repression, or ordinary assassinations for that matter, autonomous killing machines. These and similar devices for military use mainly are becoming smaller and smaller: miniaturization is the trend here also.ⁱⁱ There is no precedent to be referred to; Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), or remotely operated drones, or automated systems of response to incoming attacks are controlled in various degrees by humans

who decide about the targets and what to do with them: follow, monitor, or hit and eliminate. But even in this case there are no accepted rules or criteria guiding their use, especially in cases of killing the enemy.

For the moment there are no autonomous fighting robots deployed, but the technology is there, tested within some limits, and we are assured that technological advance will be quick – what has belonged to the domain of science fiction will become reality in a decade or so, according to some estimates. More and more states are operating drones, and there are plans for civilian use, 24 hours surveillance of territories and movements, and who knows what else. The more extensive the demand for it, the more cheap the hardware will be. The same applies to killing machines, ranging possibly from the size of insects to Terminator-like robots. Low military budget countries, as well as non-state actors will do everything to get some of them, the less sophisticated, but the most lethal on the first place.

A recent Human Rights Watch (HRW) report summarizes the main international law arguments against the use of killer robots. It states as a matter of principle that,

human robots with complete autonomy would be incapable of meeting international humanitarian law standards. The rules of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity are especially important tools for protecting civilians from the effects of war, and fully autonomous weapons would not be able to abide by those rules.

As ethics is concerned „robots would not be restrained by human emotions and the capacity for compassion, which can provide an important check on the killing of civilians.” The authors of the report, Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) believe that

such revolutionary weapons would not be consistent with international humanitarian law and would increase the risk of death or injury to civilians during armed conflict. A preemptive prohibition on their development and use is needed (*that*) technology would comply with international humanitarian law and preserve other checks on the killing.

The report recalls Article 36 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, which provides that

the development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.ⁱⁱⁱ

Perceiving the whole world as a battlefield, and claiming that there are no rules, including moral ones is one thing, pursuing or defending existing privileges in a world when all relevant actors possess some means of responding to challenges, regardless to the nature and legal status or moral acceptance of those means is something different. Asymmetry in this regard does mean only that certain tools of war are more lethal than others, as regards their destructive potentials in space and the range of the targets.

One rule applies though even in such an environment. It is well known from ancient times and is always taken into account by military strategists and planners: the law of unintended consequences, or *anaya*, in the words of Kautlyia. or why not, the cunning of reason.^{iv} Martin van Creveld in his book on *Technology and War* maintained that while technology is characterized by linear causality (repetitiveness, specialization, integration, certainty and efficiency) the logic of war is different. He made these observations three decades ago, but they are still largely valid:

The underlying logic of war is, therefore, not linear but paradoxical. The same action will not always lead to the same result. The opposite, indeed is closer to the truth. Given an opponent who is capable of learning, a very real danger exists that an action will not succeed twice because it has succeeded once. (van Creveld 1989, 316)

In the case of some of the latest technologies used for military purposes causality may not necessarily work as supposed. Viruses, whether biological or computer bugs may mutate after being released, or cause, despite all precautions, what is called “friendly fire”.

The situation may be much worse in nanotechnologies and genetics. It was in the year 2000 that Bill Joy, then the Chief Scientist of Sun Microsystems, wrote a long article on these issues. He warned, among others, that

The 21st-century technologies – genetics, nanotechnology, and robotics (GNR) – are so powerful that they can spawn whole new classes of accidents and abuses. Most dangerously, for the first time, these accidents and abuses are widely within the reach of individuals or small groups. They will not require large facilities or rare materials. Knowledge alone will enable the use of them. (Joy 2000, 4)

The problem therefore is compounded by the fact that nation-states have no full control on who is doing what in this field. Military and civilian applications are also confused and interchangeable. Genetic engineering is easily affordable for individuals and groups: new viruses and bacteria, as new species of plants and animals can be released at any time, and here the danger of unintended consequences is even more severe: we do not even imagine in most cases what type of results may occur.

With regard to nanotechnology, Joy wrote, it “has clear military and terrorist uses.” Its exceptional power, as in the case of genetic designs, is self-replication. The terrifying weapons of the 20th century have been designed and made in great, difficult to penetrate laboratories, under certain rational control and moral restraint. Not so with the new GNR technologies:

In sharp contrast, according to Joy, the 21st-century GNR technologies have clear commercial uses and are being developed almost exclusively by corporate enterprises. In this age of triumphant commercialism, technology – with science as its handmaiden – is delivering a series of almost magical inventions that are the most phenomenally ever seen (...) This is the first moment in history of our planet when any species, by its own voluntary actions, has become a danger to itself – as well as to vast numbers of theirs, he warned. (Joy 2000, 10)

The thought goes back inevitably to Max Weber’s demons and satanic forces.

There is one single element here that perhaps leaves room to some optimism, which might be at one point relevant from a moral perspective: the equality of threat. More precisely the equal exposure: nobody is invulnerable, untouchable, or securely out of the danger zone.

The latest news on the developments in cyber warfare has shown that nobody can afford at present to claim that it is fully protected from unauthorized penetration (espionage), disruptive or destructive attack. Victims of cyber attacks prefer in most cases to keep silent, and the perpetrators obviously will not come into the open. The equal distribution of threat is not something fully acknowledged yet: there are always some who think that can create the perfect protection and become immune to attacks. Until this illusion persists, no advance will be made to regulate the domain. Moreover there is thinking to prevent or retaliate to a perceived cyber threat – even without one hundred percent solid evidence on from where is coming from – by brute military force.

Surveillance society

Even the most ruthless recognize the legitimacy and implicitly the morally right character of self-defense. The philosophy behind it – in popular terms, valid to defensive military alliances as well – is that “we are ready to kill or destroy anybody who would go against our lives, liberty, and sometimes properties”. Problems start when individual cases must be judged, especially the preventive moves in the case of a putative imminent threat, the nature of the response, the means used etc. With regard to a great number of the very real threats of these times, global insofar anyone of us might be a victim anywhere, one answer is surveillance society, as a means of individual and collective self-defense.

By the end of the 20th century the methods and means of monitoring the private life or specific public acts of individuals have evolved in ways that old style totalitarian states’ leaders might have only dreamed at. In addition, in the past 20 years even non-expert individuals came to know that by using a phone, a credit card, or certain electronic devices they are exposed to monitoring of a part of their life. Therefore, the argument goes, at the price of further sacrifices of an anyway fading privacy, at least people get a certain degree of security. It looks like a god bargain, provided that certain control mechanisms and legal guarantees on who can monitor whom, how, and to what purpose do exist and function.

The dilemma even in an environ with multiple guarantees is the same of the killing machines. Computers are handling speedily, precisely and efficiently huge amounts of information, as no human being is capable,

more and more independently. But you can't argue with a software if, for example, an ordinary mistyping occurs somewhere, or worse your identity is stolen and used illicitly by others, and all that could have life-long negative consequences on you. Nothing can be definitely erased once entering the system, except the collapse of the whole superstructure. For unknown reasons you can get a red flag next to your name and may even do not know about it, until something embarrassing happens to you.

Preemption is in principle morally acceptable, but how can anybody trace the line beyond which the subject of protection becomes a victim of the very system set up to prevent the many threatening evils. Experience shows that the more radical the treatment, the more unforeseeable are the consequences. Examples abound, from the prophylactic use of antibiotics to the armed intervention to "save others into freedom."

The general (moral) dilemma behind preemption, as understood after September 11, 2001 is formulated in the following manner by Alan M. Dershowitz, the author of one of the most comprehensive books on the subject:

The shift from responding to past events to preventing future harms is part of one of the most significant but unnoticed trends in the world today. It challenges our traditional reliance on a model of human behavior that presupposes a rational person capable of being deterred by a threat of punishment. (Dershowitz 2006, 7)

War in the 21st century

Can the world reach a stage in the future when war becomes again the duel-type exercise of the 18th century, an institution governed not only by rules but also by some degree of fairness? Since, paraphrasing Raymond Aron, peace is impossible, and war is not only inevitable, but perpetual and also invisible sometimes, the optimistic answer is: perhaps, but a lot of things, including the most painful and despicable must happen before.

The spread of weapons of mass destruction in the 20th century, especially the nuclear bomb, has made war amongst nuclear powers unthinkable, but it took almost twenty years to reach a consensus that such weapons are strategic (meaning: unusable in war), at worst of last resort.

A number of experts would not exclude the possibility of wars between great powers in the 21st century, concentrated on seas, as operation theatres.^v Except a few cases, nobody dared so far – for good reasons – to use at large scale biological or chemical weapons: the law of unforeseen consequences prominently applies here. The atomic age was under the aegis of the mutually assured deterrence (MAD), a formula for the equal exposure of the very real threat of equal annihilation. It is not sure that this state of affairs will persist long into the future. With the increasing number of nuclear states the moral burden of massive scale destruction is frighteningly easing. Some NATO members did not exclude during the Iraqi war the use of smaller devices of mass destruction on the battlefield, if the enemy acted first with such means against their troops. This is not the place to speculate about how future wars will look like; what follows from the situation as it stands today, is that all generations of warfare, from the "sling and the stone"^{vi} to disruptive and/or destructive operations through the virtual space are running in parallel.

The basic distinction that made before possible any discussion on the laws of the war and the ethics of combat was between combatants and civilians. Despite the existence and sometimes use of weapons of mass destruction in the 20th century the moral stand was clear and made possible at least *post festum* the passing of judgments, including penal sentences, on what the participants have done, with the respective allocation of collective and individual moral responsibilities. Even insurgencies and counterinsurgencies have their own morality, since the goals on both sides is the mutual destruction of the political will to continue, which needs support of at least some segments of the populations concerned. The leading states of the West in new military technologies are under strong pressure by the public opinion to limit the number of casualties on their side and avoid to the greatest extent "collateral damages", another term for innocent civilian victims. The counterinsurgency manual of the US Army appear to favor non lethal means to overcome an insurgency, although the application of this principle in practice proved much more difficult than believed, therefore the dramatic increase in the use of drones for targeted killings in the past four years.^{vii}

It is too early to say whether there will be any rules of wars in the cyber-space – it is largely accepted by now that some operations undertaken against specific targets in this environment amount to acts of war. As seen, according to the Chinese authors quoted the rule is that there is no rule; however, interactivity cannot be excluded even from this filed. Martin van Creveld's observation on interactivity in strategy in general is continues to be pertinent:

Most important of all, he wrote in 1991, the essential principles of strategy will continue to be determined by its mutual, interactive character; that is, the fact that war is a violent contest between two opponents, each governed by an independent will, and to some extent free to do as he sees fit. (van Creveld, 1991, 226)

One option of the parties, and historic examples abound, is to emulate the enemy, who employed first a specific mean, whether a weapon or a tactic.

In March 2013 two major developments took place in the field of cyber warfare. The United States Cyber Command announced 12 March the creation of offensive teams. Some observers felt confused by the announcement^{viii}, but the proposal, together with previous others on the matter seem to be compatible with 2002 US National Security Concept on preventive war.

The second development was the publication of a “manual”, in fact a collection of existing rules applicable in armed conflicts with explanations and interpretations on how these rules would apply to cyber warfare.^{ix} The definition of the cyber conflict is the subject of Rule 30: “A cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death of persons or damage or destruction to objects.”

The whole logic of the manual, and how could it be else, is determined by the relationship (as indicated at the beginning of the First Part, Chapter One) “between States, cyber infrastructure, and cyber operations.” Rule 1 states that “A State may exercise control over cyber infrastructure and activities within its sovereign territory.” I believe that the use of the verb “may” is not by chance. It “may” leave a room of maneuver both for those states that are willing, but not capable of exercising sovereign control, and for those who can exercise such control on the cyber infrastructure and operations on their territory, including land, water and airspace, but “may” not recognize it publicly. Therefore, explain the experts authoring the manual a few lines below: “Under international law, States may be responsible for cyber operations that their organs conduct or that are otherwise attributable to them by virtue of the law of State responsibility. The actions of non-State actors may also sometimes be attributed to States.” It is remarkable that under Rule 30, “non-violent operations, such as psychological cyber operations, or cyber espionage, do not qualify as attacks”, although such operations constitute so far the vast majority of cyber activity with negative consequences. It goes without saying, adds the text, that operations that qualify as attacks “are not limited to acts that release kinetic force.”

In any case, it is the first time that we have a coherent framework within which cyber warfare, as some claim, part of a developing, integrated Fifth Generation Warfare, can be thought in the perspective of the existing rules of both of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*.

A few final remarks

What can be relatively safely assumed at this stage is that evolutions will follow in some way the sequence of events after WWII, when the practice of total wars brought about total or global strategies and made diplomacy and intelligence also total, both in character and technique. Hans Morgenthau’s remarks on the aristocratic international of the 18th century were not redundant in those times,^x since with the spread of the practice of highest-level decision making summits, it was assumed that leaders would not lie to each other, or at worst, will not tell the whole truth. In these days, however, lying brazenly, and even sometimes recognizing it openly and flatly (in general, and not regarding specific lies) appears to become a way of self-defense, therefore legitimate. At least hypocrisy will become futile, cynics may observe, and this is something not far of being generally accepted. No question, trust is already in short supply, and there is a real chance that it will disappear altogether from international relations, including Europe, at least in the lifetime of this policy making generation.

The value of having confidence in someone will increase proportionally. A major realignment in international relations can be reasonably expected along the lines trust/mistrust, reliable/non-reliable, but for that to occur players first must try all the means available, indeed with no rules guiding their acts and behavior. And then, we may expect the return of some solid ethical rules and why not, the consideration of war as an institution of international politics.

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Thank you for your kind collaboration. *Editor-in-Chief*

ⁱ Translation by *FBIS*, the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

Text available on <http://www.terrorism.com/documents/unrestricted.pdf>.

[*FBIS* Editor's Note: The following selections are taken from "Unrestricted Warfare," a book published in China in February 1999 which proposes tactics for developing countries, in particular China, to compensate for their military inferiority vis-à-vis the United States during a high-tech war. The selections include the table of contents, preface, afterword, and biographical information about the authors printed on the cover. The book was written by two PLA [People's Liberation Army] senior colonels from the younger generation of Chinese military officers and was published by the PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House in Beijing, suggesting that its release was endorsed by at least some elements of the PLA leadership. This impression was reinforced by an interview with Qiao and laudatory review of the book carried by the party youth league's official daily *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* on 28 June.

Published prior to the bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade, the book has recently drawn the attention of both the Chinese and Western press for its advocacy of a multitude of means, both military and particularly non-military, to strike at the United States during times of conflict. Hacking into websites, targeting financial institutions, terrorism, using the media, and conducting urban warfare are among the methods proposed. In the *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* interview, Qiao was quoted as stating that "the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden." Elaborating on this idea, he asserted that strong countries would not use the same approach against weak

countries because "strong countries make the rules while rising ones break them and exploit loopholes . . . The United States breaks [UN rules] and makes new ones when these rules don't suit [its purposes], but it has to observe its own rules or the whole world will not trust it." (see *FBIS* translation of the interview, OW2807114599) The French translation of the full text was published first in 2003: QIAO LIANG AND WANG XIANGSUI (1999): *La Guerre hors limites*. Paris, Payot [2003, 2006]

ⁱⁱ „If Air Force researchers have their way, the military’s next flying robots of doom will be tiny, and indistinguishable from the naked eye from small birds, bats or even insects, wrote Spencer Ackerman in the magazine *Wired* in one of the many pieces published on the subject recently. And they’ll take their first flight in a freaky ‘Micro-Aviary’ in Ohio, where engineers make mini-machines modeled on those creatures of the sky.” *Air Force Keeps ‘Micro-Aviary’ Of Tiny, Bird-like ‘Bots*. By Spencer Ackerman. *Wired*, 2011. November 2. <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/11/air-force-micro-aviary-drones/>

ⁱⁱⁱ *Losing Humanity The Case against Killer Robots*. Human Rights Watch and International Human Rights Clinic – Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School. 2012
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf

^{iv} Those causes of human make which affect position are policy and impolicy (*naya* and *apanaya*); fortune and misfortune (*aya* and *anaya*) are providential causes. Causes, both human and providential, govern the world and its affairs. What is unforeseen is providential; here, the attainment of that desired end which seemed almost lost is (termed) fortune. (KAUTILYA 1915, BOOK VI. CHAP. II)

^v Robert D. Kaplan in a recent article in *Foreign Policy* (November 2011) brought up a number of significant arguments for sea-warfare, as a feature of the 21st century. *The South China Sea Is the Future of Conflict. The 21st century's defining battleground is going to be on water*. (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_south_china_sea_is_the_future_of_conflict) Another leading security expert who does not exclude future conflicts between great powers is Colin S. Gray. See his book: *Another Bloody Century. Future Warfare*. London, Phoenix, 2005

^{vi} *The Sling and the Stone. On War in the 21st Century* is a book by Thomas S. Hammes on 4GW, maintaining that that this will be the determinant feature of warfare in this century. (St. Paul-USA, zenith Press, 2006)

^{vii} Nevertheless, the theory basically is this: „*Counterinsurgency (COIN)* is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (...) COIN thus involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines. Political and military leaders and planners should never underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover, they should recognize that the Armed Forces cannot succeed in COIN alone.” *Counterinsurgency. Field Manual No. 3-24*. 15 December 2006 (Final Draft). Chapter 1 (1-2)

^{viii} „First off, the command is fielding 13 offensive cyber teams that are tasked with deterring destructive cyber attacks against the United States, John Reed wrote in *Foreign Policy*. While [Gen. Keith] Alexander said these are offensive teams, he insisted their role is defensive: ‘Let me be clear, this defend-the-nation team is not a defensive team, this is an offensive team that the Department of Defense would use to defend the nation if it were attacked in cyberspace.’ If you have trouble making sense of that, you’re not alone, Reed commented. After the hearing, Alexander compared the teams to missile defenses.” *Cyber Command fielding 13 „offensive” cyber deterrent units*. By John Reed, 12 March 2013 (http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/12/us_cyber_command_developing_13_offensive_cyber_deterrence_units) A week before, the same author reported that „The Defense Science Board's new report on protecting the Pentagon's computer networks calls for the development of a special force armed with its own bombers, cruise missiles, and cyber weapons to respond to a devastating cyber attack. Kind of like a mini, conventionally-armed Strategic Command for cyber deterrence.” *Department of Defense (DoD) panel recommends special bomber-armed deterrent force*. By John Reed, 6 march 2013 (http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/06/dod_panel_recommends_special_bomber_armed_cyber_deterrent_force)

^{ix} *Tallin Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 3013. (The full text can be consulted here: <http://ccdcoe.org/249.html>)

^x “This sense of a highly personal moral obligation to be met by those in charge of foreign policy with regard to their colleagues in other countries explains the emphasis with which the writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries counseled the monarch to safeguard his ‘honor’ and his ‘reputation’ as his most precious possessions. (...) A violation of his moral obligations, as they were recognized by his fellow monarchs for themselves, would set in motion not only his conscience but also the spontaneous reactions of the supranational aristocratic society, which would make him pay for the violation of its mores with a loss of prestige; that is a loss of power.” (MORGENTHAU 1993, 237)