

THE SELF-AWARENESS AND THE FORMAL CONCEPT OF PERSON

BY AUGUSTINE AND BOETHIUS

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(Abstract) In this study I attempt to demonstrate that Boethius and Augustine of the early Christian authors do not use the regarded formal concept of person (*persona*) to designate the inner self or human being which has self-awareness or self-knowledge and which we can regard as our selves, but they describe it by the concept of man (*homo*). By this assertion can be verifiable that the terms, phrases, pronouns which used to describe the essence of man are not confused with each other and we can find a structure among descriptions. This investigation shows that Augustine and Boethius use several senses of the image of inner self and their purpose is to show the similarity of human nature to God.

Keywords: Augustine, Boethius, person, I, human being, human nature, self-awareness, self-knowledge

Outline of Article

- I. The problem of designation of 'I', self and person.
- II. The formal concept of person by Boethius
- III. The self-knowledge and the formal concept of person by Boethius
- IV. The concept of person, the image of inner self and the human nature by Augustine
- V. The human nature by Boethius

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I.

People – including philosophers – have been interested in person, 'I' or self and the way of expressing that thing which we are for a long time. It was expounded in numberless forms in antiquity what was thought about the applied notion of 'I', self, or person. The ancient authors often used the concept of person in the sense of 'mask', 'character' or 'actor'. Several modern researchers think that the original meaning of this concept is theatrical mask, but this word takes up so many special meanings in the later times, for instance the concept of legal person, one individual existence or single man, or it uses for separating the persons of Holy Trinity in Trinitological usage.¹ According to a modern way, a person is such kind of autonomic, active entity who has his or her own mental and emotional inner self and who not only takes part of a social network but shares in it. The person is a psychophysical unity which has an own 'world' to make his or her character.

According to some modern researchers the concept of person came from Christian authors,² others think that the non-Christians used the term of human (*anthropos*) to name which Christians called person³ and

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¹ J. Koterski and A. O. Rorty think that concept of person meant masks wearing actors. (Koterski, 2004: 210, Rorty, 1990: 21) In this study there is no place to investigate each single meaning of the concept of person. Thereinafter I use that concept of person which refers to the designation of singular and individual beings.

² For instance according to M. Mauss and J. Koterski. (Mauss, 1985: 19, Koterski, 2004: 208) But the approaches of these authors are different, because according to Mauss it is "the metaphysical entity of moral person" that comes from Christian thinkers, while according to Koterski it is the ontological structure of person.

others think that the concept of person can be set forth not only the Christian authors but the non-Christian ones as well. (Turcescu, 2005: 4) These varied opinions of researchers come from not only the different methods of research or the approach of investigated ancient authors, but the variedness of terms referring to the concept of person.

Richard Sorabji revealed the concept of the embodied self and grouped in 16 categories the self-concepts of antiquity. (Sorabji 2006: 32, 34-46) Christopher Gill investigated the structured self using the subjective-individualist and objective-participation term pairs and interpreting in a schematic way the approach of the concept of person, 'I' and self. (Gill 2006: xx-xxi) According to Lucan Turcescu it is very hard to grasp both the modern and the ancient concept of person because so many aspects of this concept are confused with each other for instance the concept of the soul and human being and the modern inner self image are combined in it in ancient authors. (Turcescu 2005: 8)

In my opinion the concept of person had a special meaning for Christian authors at the fifth century for which this did not confuse the image of the soul, the inner self, the self-aware or the self-know 'I' because the authors did not mention the designation of person describing the inner self. It can be seen in the works of Boethius and Augustine in which both authors use several senses of the formal concept of person and the image of inner self, 'I' or man which have self-awareness and self-knowledge. The images of 'I', self or person and inner self were often expressed by pronouns and reflexive pronouns which phrases were used to sign that individual human who can be called person. In this study my purpose is only to separate the field of engagement of the formal defined concept of person from those thoughts in which the image of inner self is explained.

II.

Boethius, after an introducing chapter, starts his treatise called *Against Eutyches* by defining the concept of nature and person. Boethius enumerates the definitions of nature and he accepts that nature is the specific difference which forms the single things (*natura eset unum quamque rem informans differentia specifica*). (OSV 1.111-112 [57-58])⁴ Boethius in a later chapter of his treatise quoted this definition in this way: nature is the specific property of any substance (*natura est cuiuslibet substantiae specificata proprietates*). (OSV 4.270-271 [6-7]) According to Boethius nature is a specific difference which is used to distinguish between genus and species and this is the same as the specific property (*proprietates*), or the proper character of the species of things.

Genus and species of beings or things differ from each other and can be corporeal or incorporeal. The corporeal things can be living or not living, the living ones can be sensitive or not sensitive and rational or irrational. The incorporeal things, substances can be rational or irrational and immutable and impassible or mutable and passible. According to Boethius only that living substance can be person which is separated from other substances by rational specific difference or specific property. Neither non living nor non sensitive nor irrational things or substances can be called person because nobody calls person neither a stone nor a tree nor animals, but God, angels and humans are called persons since their individual substances are defined by the rational specific difference. (OSV 2.130-167 [13-52]) Person is "the individual substance of rational nature (*naturae rationabilis individuas substantia*)". (OSV 3.171-172 [4-5]) This formal definition declares only that the person is the existence of a rational specific difference in an individual substance. (Marenbon, 2003: 72) What does the rational specific difference mean?

Boethius notices that substances cannot be comprehensible "which are bereft of mind and reason (*quae intellectu et ratione deseritur*)". (OSV 2.149-150 [33-34]) Boethius writes nothing about 1. what we should comprehend as reason and mind, 2. whether the function, capability or perhaps practical application of reason or mind influence in the personalization of person or not. Boethius states only that animals cannot be apprehensible as persons because they live "dumb without reason a life of sense alone (*muta ac sine rationem vitam solis sensibus degunt*)". (OSV 2.151-152 [35-36]) Boethius asserts that animals are unable to verbal, rational communication because they do not have reason. But this assertion cannot help us to see what makes a person become person. Boethius gives us more information about what makes the individual substance of person into an individual thing.

³ For instance according to T. Enberg-Pedersen. (Enberg-Pedersen, 1990: 109-110)

⁴ The abbreviation 'OS' refers to *Opuscula Sacra* and 'C' to *Consolatio Philosophiae* while the Roman numerals after that refer to the treaties of *Opuscula Sacra* and the books of *Consolatio*, and the chapter number and the line number of the edition of Moreschini follows this – except that part of the treaties which does not have chapter number – then comes the line number of the edition of Stewart in square bracket.

In the treatise *Against Eutychem* he says that the properties and the specific differences make the substance individual and the substance bears its accidental qualities. (OSV 3.117-120 [53-55]) These accidental qualities do not add to the individualization of the substance but only characterize that substance which bears these. Contrarily in other treatise called *On Trinity* Boethius thinks that single people who can be separated by number are different in their accidental qualities, like – for instance of corporeal substances – that place (*locus*) which it fills in. (OSI 1.57-63 [24-31])

The properties (*propriates*) can be asserted in several senses about substances and they can refer to several species essentially or they can assert to one substance accidentally, in a temporal, or an atemporal way. (Isag. IV.1.) The Boethian division of substances – which I have written earlier – comes from Porphyry⁵ just as his approach of these properties according to which the essential asserting properties are the same with nature comprehended as a specific difference. Porphyry believes that the combination of properties can identify and describe one single person. (Isag II.15.) Boethius thinks that the most properly temporal or atemporal properties functioning as specific differences and characterizing one single human and accidental qualities together can give successful description about one individual substance.⁶

Boethius regards human as a rational being but did not mention the effect of single differences coming from the use of mind, he applies this term only to the designating essence of mind or reason of person. The properties and accidental qualities of individual substances together cannot ensure the temporal identity of individual substances, only their individuality as regards of temporal assertable properties, such as graying. (Arliq, 2009: 139-140) The Boethian definition of person is a formal one and it shows up the metaphysical structure of substances which can be called person, including human being.

III.

In *Consolation of Philosophy* Boethius gives more detailed image about his anthropological idea. In Boethius' notion, a human being has sense, imagination, reason and mind. Humans live in the world lead by God's providence and by that way which is chosen by their free will, as an autonomic being. Humans are not absolute but contingent because they are mutable and passible, their desire and craving influence their own decision. Man possesses to choose what (s)he wants to be and God's providence does not impede in it because God observes the events of the created world from his 'eternal present' which events are necessary from God's aspect. These events even if are necessary, their necessity is not a simple or an absolute necessity (*necessitas simplex*) but a conditional or a temporally one (*necessitas condicionis* or *temporalis*) therefore God's providence does not mean the determination of the created world's moving. (CV 6.92-134 [94-139])

According to Boethius the quality of knower determinates the knowledge of one thing and not the quality of the thing determinates the knower because "man himself also sense, imagination, reason and mind look at in different ways". (CV 4.80-81 [82-84]) The sense grasps material things, imagination stands up the sensible things by image (*imaginaria*), the reason (*ratio*) knows things by its own notion and mind (*mens*) recognizes the essence of things in an indivisible and holistic way. (CV 4.91-97 [95-100])

Boethius writes that: "He wanted man to be above all earthly things [...] For the nature of man is such that he is better than other things only when he knows himself and yet if he cease to know himself he is made lower than the brutes. For it is natural for other animals not to have this self-knowledge; in man it is fault." (CII 5.73-87 [75-89])

In this passage the capability of self-knowledge is the knowledge of reason and it means only the knowing himself of man and it is not the self-awareness by the self-reflective process of mind. Boethius points out 1. the ontological status of man, and 2. man's similarity to God by showing the capability and devices of knowing. He says that man is better than not only animals by his capability of self-knowledge but than all other things which are under the animals. In here, just like in *Against Eutychem* – which we have seen earlier – we find the categorization of beings or substances where the self-knowledge is that difference by which human race can be separated from other ones. The reason knows itself which can mean that the rational nature in the definition of person could be self-knowledge. But Boethius does not give good reason to decide this question. This thought shows an equal structure in both treatise as regards it gets to man by

⁵ Boethius divides the genus of beings to genus and species in such way than that method which is called 'Porphyry's tree'. The Division of Porphyry can be found in the second chapter of his treaty *Isagoge*. (Isag. II.6.) This treaty of Porphyry is translated into Latin by Boethius who has also written two commentaries for it.

⁶ In Isag. 85.20-87.17. According to A. Arliq Boethius gives more complicated answer to the problem of individualization. According to Arliq, by Boethius the designated matter functions as individualization factor by form. The individualized substance is able to carry on the accidental quality which assents to describe the substance. (Arliq 2009: 141)

categorizing the ontological structure of being, but Boethius does not call person (*person*) the self-knowing man, he uses the term ‘human’ (*homo*).

Boethius has two purposes by the definition of nature and person: at first to refute the incorrect Christological teaching of Nestorius and Eutychem and at second to support the Christological teaching of the Church. According to the teaching of the Church and Boethius Christ’s person is of two natures and in two natures, a divine one and a human one. The two natures unite in Christ’s person in a way that both natures have remained what they were before the unity. The natures cannot be separated and they make one indivisible individual substance, which is Christ’s person himself. (OSV 7.607-613 [25-31]) Boethius uses the concept of person in a Trinitological context as well, designating the divine person of Trinity by the persons’ own qualities and their own relations with the other two persons.

The Boethian definition of person fulfils the Christological criteria because it suggests that divine and human rational natures exist in one individual substance, namely in an indivisible and unrepeatable one. This concept of person does not require to work up the application of reason and mind in this context. Boethius attributes rational specific difference to God⁷ for that he ranked God among incorporeal, immutable and impassible substances and attributed to man which is ranked among corporeal, living, sensible and rational substances. The rational nature here is only a specific difference and as regards to this context it does not matter what quality it embodies. Its function is, on the one hand separating genus to species, species to species, and on the other hand designating the essence of those species which are separated from other genus and species. The concept of person in these ages had a special field of application in Trinitological and Christological debates and Boethius researches for an answer to a different question. In a Trinitological and Christological context the formal definition of person is sufficient to solve the problems and to present the ontological and metaphysical structure of man.

Boethius asserts that the human being is not only similar to God but it has to be similar to God and – in a special sense – it has to be God. Human mind is able to recognize and to look at the things and with this capability it is able to recognize or to comprehend things like God does it. These functions are not included in the self-knowing reason but in the mind. Man can be similar to God by his mind (*mens*).⁸ Before Boethius, Augustine found self-awareness in the mind’s abilities of self-knowledge.

IV.

Augustine has used the concept of person (*persona*) in several meanings. Since he wrote his treatises before the Christological debates, we cannot speak about the term of person elaborated during the Christological debates. The fields of application of the concept of person in his treatises are the following:

- for naming divine persons when solving Trinitological problems,
- for naming Christ,
- for the thought of ‘I’ which has self-knowledge and self-awareness through which the soul has an ‘inner world’, conceived in his treatises called *On Trinity*.

Augustine’s approach of Trinitology follows the well-known and accepted view of the Church. According to Augustine we can assert Trinity in a singular number, because the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit constitute one unity, the Holy Trinity itself. God’s essence is the same as His being, in other case we should assert three divine essences and three gods, but God is one, He is one essence and three divine persons (*persona*). The reason why Trinity is not three substances but three persons is that earlier Augustine has used the term of substance in a meaning of essence and he wanted to avoid the confusion of terms. Person in this meaning is such entity which can be separated by its own quality from other beings, but it does not have own essential existence.

Augustine uses the term of person in a Christological context as well, when describing Christ himself. Augustine in some places separates assertions⁹ referring to the divine nature of Christ from those which refer

⁷ Against the usual approaches, Boethius thinks, on the one hand that God is one of the beings and on the other hand that God is such kind of substance or being which leads the created things laying under it. (OSV 2.142 [25]; OSV 3.258-264 [95-101])

⁸ Boethius does not write it in an explicit way. In one passage he writes about the foreknowledge of future events that the human reason (*humana ratio*) and divine recognition, comprehension or mind (*divina intelligentia*) are similar to each other (CV 5.38-39 [39-41]) but in other place he said that God is able to recognize the future events by seeing the nature or essence of things. (CV 6.74-80 [77-83]) But the essence of things are not recognized by the reason, but by the mind.

⁹ De trin. I.13.28-31, where he says that “according to that form who is the Son of man (*secundum formam qua Filius hominis*) or “according to that one who is the Son of God (*secundum quem Dei Filius*)”.

to his human nature and in other places he wrote about Christ as Mediator between God and man¹⁰. In Christ's person we can assert to both united natures referring only, on the one hand to Christ's person itself and, on the other hand only to one of his nature. But Augustine does not expound the formal Christology and for him Christ was such entity who mediated between God and the created world, redeemed by Christ. (Grillmeier, 1990: 598-599)

Augustine mentions about the inner self which has self-awareness and this thought is often compared with the notion of the Cartesian thinking thing.¹¹ In my opinion the Cartesian notion can be compared only to one aspect of the Augustinian thought. Augustine writes in several places about the inner self of man but it's not always obvious what 'inner' means. Augustine thinks that a human being is a soul having body which has – among others – sense, imagination, memory, reason (*ratio*) and mind (*mens*). Augustine's purpose in his treaty called on Trinity is to demonstrate that the qualities of the Trinity's divine persons can be found in men, which is impression of Trinity. His approach human mind is able to recognize itself and it comprehends itself. He writes that: "Does that which knows itself in part, not know itself in part? But it is absurd to say, that it does not as a whole know what it knows. I do not say, it knows wholly; but what it knows, it as a whole knows. When therefore it knows anything about itself, which it can only know as a whole, it knows itself as a whole".¹² (De trin. X.4.6.)

Augustine writes that the mind is able to be aware of itself and recognize itself as a holistic one being aware of its unity (*totum se scire*) and in these lines he said nothing about man's self-knowledge. In other place he wrote about the self-knowledge of mind (*se noscere*): "Whereby, then, does it know its own knowing, if it does not know itself? For it knows that it knows other things, but that it does not know itself [...] For it does not know that some other mind knows, but that itself does so. Therefore it knows itself in some way. Further, when it seeks to know itself, it knows itself now as seeking". (De trin. X.3.5.)

In this passage Augustine speaks about the mind's self-knowledge and self-awareness, because according to him thinking itself does not mean to recognize some knowledge but being aware of itself. (De trin. X.5.7.) We find such thoughts in these passages which can point at a correspondence to the notion of Descartes' thinking thing, namely these texts are about such thinking and self-aware entity which recognizes itself in some way, for instance by thinking, remembering, desiring.¹³ But Augustine writes about the notion of the self-aware 'I' not only in that meaning in which Descartes did.

In other passages Augustine discusses the present of self-awareness as one status of the man's growing. He thinks that we could not know surely about children when they think about their "inner things" but it is sure that they know about themselves "when man can think about nature of own soul". (De trin. XIV.5.8.) Augustine says children become thinking during growing up and will be able to know themselves. In this passage Augustine seeks when the child starts to think about nature of his own soul, he did not analyze the self-awareness.

The nature of soul is an inner, subjective factor for men, but the nature of the soul is not subjective because it is the same for all men. The nature describes the essence of human race and not the quality of a single person. The notion of Descartes' 'I' refers only to a certain point found in a doubter 'I', and it does not expand to other 'I' which are objective for the doubter 'I'. Augustine is concerned about man who can awake to itself by its capability, and this way to the similarity with God during the seeking of God.

In other passage Augustine distinguishes inner and outer man. He writes: "Come now, and let us see where lies, as it were, the boundary line between the outer and inner man. For whatever we have in the mind common with the beasts, thus much is rightly said to belong to the outer man. For the outer man is not to be considered to be the body only, but with the addition also of a certain peculiar life of the body (*sed adiuncta quadam vita sua*) [...]". (De trin. XII.1.1.)

The distinction of inner and outer man is not the same as in the modern subjective-objective pair. By Augustine the exterior man includes not only the material relation of man but also those capabilities which join it to the corporeal world, for instance imagination and memory, which can fulfil their function by the image coming from the outside world. In here Augustine refers to Apostle Paul who separates the corporeal

¹⁰ We can find that in several parts of the thought which begins from De trin. IV. 8. 12., where the subject of assertion is Christ himself, the Mediator.

¹¹ For instance R. Sorabji (Sorabji, 2006: 216-221) and Ch. Taylor who finds the radical reflection of person or self in the writings of Augustine and according to Taylor, Augustine was the first in the history of western philosophy who created the inner world of man. (Taylor, 1989: 131)

¹² All Augustinian texts are translated by Arthur West Hadden.

¹³ S. Harrison collectives and analyzes the Augustinian antecedents of Cartesian 'I'. (Harrison, 2006: 130-149) In this paper is no place to analyze the relative arguments.

man from the inner one. (Rom. 7,5-23.) The question is: what does “certain peculiar life of the body” mean in the quoted passage? Augustine could refer to two things with this: 1. all things which come from physical world belong to outer man, 2. life of outer man is not a life with faith. The difference between inner and outer man does not come from the distinction of mentality and physicality but from the faithful life.

Apostle Paul writes about such inner man who takes delight in God’s law and sees that there is not any good thing in its body “for willing is present for me, but bringing the good about is not”,¹⁴ and “I do, it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwells in me”. Troels Enberg-Pedersen analyzes Paul’s discussion and says that Paul distinguishes between 1. a corporeal, non-Christian outer self or ‘I’ and a Christian inner self or ‘I’, 2. and the self-identical or self-reflective ‘I’ and knowing of dissociated ‘I’ or some kind of self-awareness. (Enberg-Pedersen 2006: 182-183) In my opinion this approach is incorrect on account of that Paul distinguishes between two men or ‘I’ only by faithful life and he does not associate it with self-reflective awareness. When Paul writes “For I have seen¹⁵ that in me, (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing” (Rom 7, 18) he does not phrase self-reflective awareness but that the doctrine of faith and said that life according to body does not follow the Christian religious directives because the sin in me overwrites these directives but following it this process could be change. According to my approach Augustine uses the same distinction between inner and outer man with Paul’s view.

Augustine connects ascension of the soul to human properties and separation from physical world. He says that everything which is related to the physical world belongs to outer man and we do not differ from animals by it but our body is straightened and tends to higher, divine, heavenly things. Man is able to ascend to comprehensible truths with their mind by grasping the thoughts. (De trin. XII.1.1.,2.2.) Augustine concludes on mental ability of man is prominent by man’s physical qualities and straightened walk. The human nature is emphasized for that it is able to involve the image of Trinity namely the image of Trinity can be found in man but on the one hand not only in inner man but in a two kinds of man together and on the other hand only when the soul is not shared by things of the physical world and contemplates eternal world. Man has to turn to eternal truth while he is present in physical and spiritual world equally. (De trin. XII.4.4.)

Augustine uses the mental and physical capability of man for that to take out the man of the other beings especially of animals and to take up sphere of divine things. It can be possible only when the soul does not disperse into the things of physical world and it is focused on divine things and God alone. The two man’s idea is grasped in this thought by that man or soul is not to turn to the outer world and not to become outer man because in this case it would turn from the higher level things and in the last resort God himself. As a matter of fact even if the soul turns out the outer world it has to turn inner to the inner man and God’s law because the soul can find the divine things in the earthly ones. This distinction of two men comes from the approaching of neoplatonic philosophy and it has religious features which is reduced to Apostle Paul’s view.¹⁶

According to Augustine, Trinity can be recognized in human mind and functions of mind for example in the ability of knowing itself, its self-awareness and in the soul if it turns to divine things. Augustine demonstrates it by several instances and divisions. The image of the Trinity can be grasped to higher motions, like love: who loves is the Father, whom is loved is the Son and love is the Holy Spirit. In another approach, mind is the image of Father, recognition is the image of Son and love is the image of Holy Spirit in the soul, or in different aspect remembrance, recognition and will demonstrate the image of Trinity. Trinity can be comprehended not only by the ability of inner man but by those capabilities which connect with the material world, like rational soul (*anima rationalis*) however this is not comprehended as a real and true image of Trinity, because it does not come from God directly but by the image of corporeal things. Augustine thinks that function of reason gets sense belonging to corporeal things by images of these and could know about God by His creatures, physical things and the goodness of these things but human mind can recognize the divine things directly. If man is not by the order of the worlds and divine things he becomes inferior than animals. With this, Augustine points out that 1. man is similar to God as regards to the mind and its ability, 2. ignoring of using of mind or incorrect using of mind remove man into his position of created world and loses possibility to reach happiness. Augustine ascertains religious and lifestyle differences between inner and outer man and does not refer to self-awareness, but this belongs to inner man because inner man can be aware of himself.

¹⁴ It is translated by Professor Enberg-Pedersen.

¹⁵ In this passage in English translation of Paul’s letter to Romans there is a term of ‘know’ but in the Greek text there is ‘*oida*’ which means ‘I have seen’.

¹⁶ Ph. Cary thinks it in connection with other passages as well in his book about Augustinian inner self. (Cary, 2000: 49)

V.

Boethius says that man has to be similar to God. Man is on the one hand similar to God by his reason (*ratio*), which Boethius presents by ontological categories during explaining his Christological teaching – as we have seen earlier – and on the other hand the ability of knowing itself and using its mind take up man to other beings and make him similar to God. In this meaning nature is a specific difference (*differentia specifica*) but Boethius uses this term in several other meanings. Boethius says that nature “gives to each what is fitting for it” and in an other passage he writes that each things are what its nature are because “the nature of things produces what is proper to it (*agit enim cuiusque rei natura quod proprium est*).¹⁷ The nature could be: 1. the forming factor of a singular man and its fate, 2. the describing term of species of some kind of being, 3. the factor which represents the properties of singular things.

The nature of man is good and man is not willing to be vicious, on the one hand because vicious or bad itself is the privation of being and nobody would like to lose his being, on the other hand because his purpose is to get happiness. Boethius says men seek after those things which are available for him and obtains what God’s providence makes available for him. Happiness is the collective of good things but only that highest Good can make man happy by which all things can become good. The highest Good is God himself and man can be good and happy by the participation in divinity. Boethius thinks that man is able to participate in form of divinity for which everybody can be divine. Certainly it is not the same as that everybody can be God himself because, on the one hand there is only one God, on the other hand the participated thing is at a lower level than which it participates in.

The sources of this thought of Boethius are doubtful. Most likely it goes back to neoplatonic philosophy, especially to Plotinus’ treatises.¹⁸ Man is led to the wrong way by his own desires and mistakes but he has to choose the good by his free will to be similar to God, to reach the happy life and to fit the position of human nature in the created world.

VI.

Both Augustine and Boethius expound the ethical responsibility notion of ‘I’ or man who knows itself and has self-awareness, reason, mind and free will and its ability designates its position in the created world. Both authors think that man can move out from his appointed position by a wrong decision made by his free will only but man is able to get happiness with the fitting application of free will by choosing the good and correct deeds.

Augustine and Boethius use several meanings of the concept of person, for instance often as ordinary usage, sometimes as a technical term meaning, and several times as a formal concept, however the modern self-aware and self-reflective notion of self or ‘I’ is not called person but human being (*homo*). In Trinitological or Christological contexts it is not needed to talk about self-reflection or self-awareness because the analysis or mention of these influence neither the description of Christ’s essence nor the solving of the problems of Trinitology.

Authors using the self-aware or self-know notion of ‘I’ do not apply the thought of this to ensure the temporal identity and individuality of singular man which come up defining the concept of person. Authors have devoted their attention to the notion of social, active agent during expounding or mentioning self-awareness or self-knowledge. But the description of this notion from the perspective of the discussed authors is not considered person because it simply assumes different orientations, and it answers different questions than the formal concept of person for solving theological problems and metaphysical positioning of man. For this, it becomes clear that by ancient authors the usage of concept of person can be separated from the application field of the notion of ‘I’, self or man.

¹⁷ CII 6.53-54 [53-54] H. Chadwick draws attention to that Boethius’ definition corresponds to Pope Leo’s definition which is in his first *Tomus*. (Epsit. 28.4.) (Chadwick, 1980: 192) Leo writes about Christ’s divine and human nature: “both forms produce, in unity with other, what is proper to it” (*agit enim utraque formam cum alterius communione quod proprium est*). In this passage Pope Leo describes the nature or form as properties of species. The similarity of phrasing makes doubtful that Boethius uses several concept of nature and can be possible Boethius’ usage can be only literary phrases.

¹⁸ For instance Enn. I.4.6. J. Magee and H. Chadwick pointed out that Boethius refer to Plato’s *Timaeus* both in implicit and explicit way (for example: CIII 9.94 [99]) especially in book 3 and verse 9, for this probably Boethius’ thoughts go back to Plato’s ideas. But Boethius used such phrases in book 3 and chapter 10 which can refer to several authors, for instance to Seneca, Plotinus or to neoplatonic commentators of Plato’s works. (Magee 2008: 190-197; Chadwick 1980: 234-236)

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Siklósi István: The Self-awareness and the formal concept of person by Augustine and Boethius. *Délkelet Európa – South-East Europe International Relations Quarterly*, Vol. 4. No.1. (Spring 2013) 8 p.

Thank you for your kind collaboration. *Editor-in-Chief*