

KOSOVO
DURING THE TENSE RELATIONS BETWEEN ALBANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA
IN SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

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(Abstract) Kosovo during the tense relations between Albania and Yugoslavia in the sixties and seventies of the twentieth century is the object of this paper. This period distinguished for the raise of the autonomous institutions of Kosovo. This study is based on a more contemporary analysis of the Albanian, Serbian and international historical research, as well as on the latest documents of the American, Russian, Serbian and Albanian provenance. The Albanian scholarship has considered these relations as a result of the tense international relations during the Cold War, especially between the two camps: the eastern and western ones, but also as a result of internal changes within Yugoslavia. The Albanian state found its interest in these developments. Independently from the secondary documents that emerge, the internal developments in Kosovo, and further on, the political assessments and also those cultural and scholarly promoted from Tirana and Pristina show that in their essence, they were delineated by the national paradigm. Meanwhile, this did not impede the Albanian or Yugoslav parties to not use these activities for international propaganda: good neighbors (Albanians) and political and cultural development of the minorities (Yugoslavs). In reality, more than Albanians or Yugoslavs, Albanian Kosovars profited from this, not only by raising their own political, economic, educational, cultural and social institutions, but also by enhancing the national spirit, which in 1981 exploded into a movement, which would prepare the crisis and the final countdown of the Yugoslav Federation.

Keywords: Kosovo, Albania, Yugoslavia, international relations, political, economic, educational and cultural status, Albanians

Outline of Article

The Albanian-Yugoslav relations in the context of international relations
Albania's attitude towards Kosovo's political movement in the 1960
The Demand for the Republic of Kosovo and Albania attitude
Albania's hesitation towards the activity of the Kosovo National Movement
Albania's Attitude to events in Yugoslavia in the early '70s
Kosovo in the ideological war of Albania
Attitudes of Enver Hoxha and Fadil Hoxha on the issue of Kosovo in the 70s

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Introduction

The conflict between Tito and Ranković and the loss of the latter influenced in a more liberal climate in the political life in Yugoslavia. This climate was especially articulated in the creation of political institutions in Kosovo. After the IV Plenum of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, known as the Plenum of Brions, 1 July 1966,¹ and under the huge pressure of the local and international progressive forces, Tito was forced to allow some tolerance towards Kosovo. Noel Malcolm stated that during this period, various benefits were allowed to Albanians. In March 1967, Tito visited Kosovo after 16 years and during this time, he criticized publicly the conditions in Kosovo: “It is not possible to speak about equal rights,” – he stated, “since Serbs have priority everywhere in fabrics, ... whereas Albanians are refused, even though they have the same or sometimes better qualifications.”² Only some years after this Plenum, the University of Prishtina was founded (1970), and it became a strong basis for the Albanian patriotic movement; higher employment of Albanian citizens took place in the state administration; Albanian qualified staff was placed in the state administration, although in a slow pattern; some investments were done in the basic industry, especially in the energy, agriculture, infrastructure, and mining sectors.³

This is the reason, why some Albanian and foreign historians emphasize in their analysis a progress in economy, administration, culture, education, which means in all the political, economic, and social systems. That improved the living standard of this political unit of the Yugoslav Federation, where more than 90% of its population was of ethnic Albanian. Even though all these investments were done, Kosovo remained one of the most undeveloped regions of the Yugoslav Federation,⁴ although Serbian scholars continued to think these constitutional changes accelerated the huge economic and political Yugoslav crisis.⁵ Meanwhile, a qualitative change happened, with the rise of the constitutional position of Kosovo.⁶

The Albanian-Yugoslav relations in the context of international relations

A new relationship between Albania and Yugoslavia started in this period: a process of relaxation in the relations Albanian-Yugoslavia. This relaxation came as a result of the huge local political, regional, and international changes, searching for new relations between Albania and Yugoslavia. The historian, Hamit Kaba, presenting the reflections of the relations between Albania and the USSR and those between Albania and the USA in the sixties of the twentieth century, emphasized that “the changes that happened in the Albanian-Soviet relations after the Bucharest plenum of 24 June 1960, were unexpected for the Soviet leadership (...). After the mulch-annual phase of incubation, the Albanian-Soviet misunderstandings became public in November 1960.⁷ Albania approached China and in 1961 interrupted all the relations with the Soviet Union. Presenting the position of Albania in the international relations in the sixties of the twentieth century, Kaba stated: “The relations to the USA continued to be separated. There was no serious attempt to resettle the diplomatic relations between the two countries (...). In the beginning of the sixties, the foreign

1 Branko Petranović - Momčilo Zečević, *Jugoslavija 1918-1984*. Zbirka dokumenata. RAD. /Rezolucija Informacionog Biroa Komunističke Partije o stanju u KPJ, 28 juni 1948/. Beograd, 1985, 942-947.

2 Noel Malcolm, *Kosova – një histori e shkurtër. (Përktue nga anglishtja dr. Abdullah Karjagdiu, ripunuar nga Piro Misha. Botim i dytë)*. (Kosovo – A Short History. Translated from English into Albanian dr. Abdullah Karjagdiu, edited by Piro Misha, second edition). Prishtinë-Tiranë: Koha & Shtëpia e librit, 2001, 332.

3 Xhelal Gjeçovi (red. shk.) *Historia e popullit shqiptar (1939-1990)*. (History of the Albanian People). Tiranë: Botimet Toena, 2008, vol. IV, 348-356.

4 Ismet Gusia, *Burimet natyrore si faktor i zhvillimit ekonomik të Kosovës* (Natural Resources as a factor in the economic development of Kosovo). Prishtinë: Rilindja, 1982; Marenglen Verli, *Ekonomia e Kosovës në vargonjtë e politikës jugosllave 1945-1990* (The Kosovo economy in the chains of the Yugoslav politics). Tiranë: Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë, 2000; Branko Horvat, *Kosovsko pitanje*. Zagreb: Globus, 1987; Mishel Ru, ‘...Kosova: një zhvillim ekonomik i ngadalshëm dhe i pamjaftueshëm.’ (Kosovo: A slow and insufficient economic development) “Herodote”, May – July, Toulouse France, 1982, cited from the book: “E vërteta mbi Kosovën dhe shqiptarët në Jugosllavi.” (The Truth on Kosovo and Albanians in Yugoslavia) Tiranë: Akademia e Shkencave e RPS të Shqipërisë, 1990, 459-476.

5 Dragutin V. Marsenić, *Ekonomika Jugosllavije*. Beograd, 2000, 213-218.

6 N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, 327-347; Luan Omari, ‘Ndryshimet kushtetuese dhe autonomia e Kosovës.’ (Constitutional changes and the autonomy of Kosovo), In: “E vërteta mbi Kosovën dhe shqiptarët në Jugosllavi.” (The Truth about Kosovo and Albanians in Yugoslavia) Tiranë: Akademia e Shkencave e RPS të Shqipërisë, 1990, 520-545.

7 Hamit Kaba, *Shqipëria në rrjedhën e luftës së ftohtë* (Albania in the course of the Cold War). Tiranë: Botimpex, 2007, 164.

policy of the Albanian state was completely unbalanced: the interruption of relations to USSR, the abnormal relations to Balkan neighbors, the hostility to USA, its indifference to Italy and France.”⁸ The Albanian-Soviet conflict reached its peak in November 1960, at the Conference of Moscow, where the Albanian leaders, Enver Hoxha, Mehmet Shehu, Hysni Kapo and Ramiz Alia accused the politics of Khrushchev. 16 November 1960, Enver Hoxha accused the USSR about the urge of the anti-communist revolution in Albania and about the support of the Greek pretensions towards the south of Albania.

Beqir Meta has noticed that Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership were ready to take into account the claims of Greece towards Albania, if the latter one would agree with the USSR politics.⁹ In June 1961, the Soviet troops started to leave the base of Vlora.¹⁰ China wanted to extend its influence in Eastern Europe and especially in the Balkans, which was considered to be a good basis. For this reason, China wanted Albania to have good diplomatic relations to Yugoslavia. All the archival documents show that the Chinese made an extraordinary pressure on Albania in order to reach such a relationship.¹¹ A period of relaxation in the Albanian-Yugoslav relations started at the beginning of the '60, associated with declarations for support in case of aggression.

Khrushchev tried to isolate Albania, searching also the support of Yugoslavia and at the same time in his political strategy he had analyzed the possibility of using anti-Enverist elements in Albania and in Kosovo, in order to make Enver Hoxha fall down from his power. In the following document of the U.S. Department of State is presented a dialogue between the councilor of the Yugoslav embassy, Ruzić, with the American representative Robert C. Mud, on 2 February 1962: “The Soviets have asked the Yugoslavs to join them against Albania. Bulgarians have made the same proposal to the Yugoslav officials (...). Yugoslavs are interested to continue the peace and stability in the Balkans and for this reason rejected the Soviet and Bulgarian proposals.”¹²

Kosovo was always considered by Yugoslavia as potentially anti-communist and as a strong vehicle to make the regime of Enver Hoxha collapse. It is a fact that in the Albanian territories, occupied by Yugoslavia, nothing ideological was accepted to come from Belgrade and from Moscow. For this reason, the communist ideology through Belgrade, which was a symbol of repression and oppression, could not find any support in the Albanian population in Yugoslavia. Even the invitation of the Yugoslav Communist Party to have Albanians fight with them in the common war, it did not find any support.¹³ This shows that the national political movement of the Albanians in Yugoslavia continued to inspire national unity, although there was a huge pressure by all the forms of the Yugoslav powers and regimes.¹⁴ In the same way, the continues attempts of the Yugoslav state to stir Albanians of Yugoslavia against Albania were never successful. For this reason, “the Yugoslavs believe that Hoxha had Albania under total control. Hoxha and his clique doubt at the *gege* and observe them with a special care. The majority of the Albanians in Kosmet are *gege*, that is why the anti-Hoxha potentials of Yugoslavia in Albania are limited,” is mentioned in the report of the American State Department.¹⁵

At the same time, Enver Hoxha was all the time attentive and careful with Kosovo issue. There was a fear that Yugoslavia would use Kosovo and Albanians of Yugoslavia to make him fall. After the events of the following years, especially demonstrations of the year 1968, the politics of the Albanian state were withdrawn and afraid by their intentions. In the above mentioned document: “The Russians, in any case, continue to believe that they can make Enver Hoxha fall. The Yugoslavs do not believe that Russians can do

8 H. Kaba, op. cit., 165.

9 Beqir Meta, *Shqipëria dhe Greqia 1949-1990. Paqja e Vështirë* (Albania and Greece 1949-1990. The Difficult Peace). Tiranë: Koçi, 2004, 165-206.

10 Valentina Duka, *Histori e Shqipërisë 1912-2000* (History of Albania 1912-2000). Tiranë: Kristalina KH, 2007, 273-274.

11 “National Archives and Record Administration of United States of America.” Aerogram of the American Embassy in Paris to the State Department on 21 October 1968, concerning the Sino-Albanian relations. Enver Hoxha, *Ditari politik për çështje ndërkombëtare 1970-1971* (Political Diary on International issues 1970-1971. For internal use only). Tiranë, 1970-1971, 432. [The manuscript is in the personal archive of the author]; Edwin Jacques, *Shqiptarët* (Albanians). Tiranë: Shb Kartë e pendë, 1995, 522-523.

12 *United States National Archives*. (Henceforth: USNA) 767.00/2-262. Memorandum of the talk between the political adviser of the Yugoslav Embassy in USA, and the representative of the State Department on 2 February 1962, 1-5.

13 Xh. Gjeçovi, op. cit., 129-133.

14 *Komiteti Mbrojtja Kombëtare e Kosovës* (Committee for the National Protection of Kosovo). Tiranë: Akademia e Shkencave, Arkiva Shtetërore, Instituti i Historisë, 2004; *Vendimet e Konferencës së Bujanit* (Decisions of the Bujani Conference). Prishtinë: ASHAK, 2005.

15 USNA, 767.00/2-262, 1-5.

this, at least not for some time still. The Yugoslavs and the Greeks have agreed that the best politics against Albania for the moment is to have their *hands away*.”¹⁶

The years of the relaxation of the diplomatic relations between Albania and Yugoslavia present a new development phase for the Albanians in Yugoslavia, which would create more favorable political space for action.

In this period, the Albanian patriotic movement, having a more favorable political space for action, put new duties to its small and not so strong structures to rise up into a better form of organization. Making its political concepts massive, especially among the young people and students,¹⁷ it was one of its main duties and also one of the most important activities in action. It was in its strengthening phase, in the transition from the group organization into organization into a movement or in a party. It also managed to have its periodical press: to be well organized in the diasporas and to settle important contacts with international institutions in order to support the war of the Albanian people for its freedom.¹⁸

Gaining expertise from the continuous wars waged by the democratic powers of the time, the national movement managed to formulate and publicly present its requirements about the new constitutional and juridical order of Kosovo, respectively the raise of its political status.

Since the Second World War, it was the first time to raise the question of the Republic of Kosovo. At this time, this request for the new constitutional and juridical position of Kosovo was openly presented and with less state pressure and violent resistance.

The political Kosovo leadership was not satisfied with the constitutional and juridical position of Kosovo, since it was politically dependent and responsive to the Serbian and Yugoslavian political leadership.¹⁹ At the federal level, at this time, there was a need for starting a new process of changes in all the levels of the Yugoslav state. Faced under this huge pressure of the internal and external events, of the continuous requests by all the levels of the Kosovo society and especially under the pressure of the national movement, the Committee for constitutional changes in Kosovo was created in 1968. Head of this committee was nominated the ex-commander of the Partisan military forces during the Second World War, Fadil Hoxha.

Constitutional discussions began, first in big centers. On August 16, 1968, in the political unit of Gjakova, a town with a rich structure of intellectuals and communists since World War II, which also provided the capital Pristina with the major bulk of state-political structures of Kosovo: „1. In the constitution of the SFRY, the Albanian nationality was to be nominated a nation; 2. The use of the Albanian national flag was to be determined by constitution and law 3. The province of Kosovo was to be proclaimed Republic of Kosovo. The stand of the Gjakova unit was almost unanimously supported by all the political units of Pristina, Gjilan, Peja and Mitrovica”.²⁰ These discussions made in the political bodies of the institutions of Kosovo, led a significant number of intellectuals such as Fehmi Agani, Gazmend Zajmi Ali Hadri, Dervish Rozhaja, Bardhyl Çausi, Mark Krasniqi, Rrezak Shala, Ramadan Vraniqi, Hajredin Hoxha and Syrja Pupovci to advocate and support the request for the Republic of Kosovo.²¹

Simultaneously, discussions were held within the framework of the national political movement on shaping the political platform, about what requirements should be presented in relation to the Yugoslav and international factor. Three policy options were established: 1. Union with Albania, 2. Union of Albanian lands in Yugoslavia in a republic within the Yugoslav federation and 3. The Republic of Kosovo. The question was about the dilemma, whether the Republic of Kosovo violated or deviated the idea of unification

16 Ibid.

17 Ethem Çeku, *Struktura politike e ilegales së Kosovës (Political structure of the Illegality of Kosovo)*, Tiranë, 2006; Ibid. *Struktura politike e ilegales së Kosovës. Brezi '81 (Political structure of the Illegality of Kosovo. Generation 81)*. Prishtinë, 2006.

18 See Ethem Çeku, *Struktura politike e ilegales së Kosovës (Political structure of the Illegality of Kosovo)*, Tiranë, 2006. This monography discusses extensively the activities of the patriotic Movement of the Albanians in Yugoslavia, based on sources of the Yugoslav province and of the archives of the Movement.

19 *Razgovor predsednika Savezne Skupštine Eduarda Kardelja sa delegacijom Autonomne Pokrajine Kosova i Metohije, održan 21 marta 1967, godine, stenografske beleške*. Arkivi i Kosovës, Fondi: Komiteti Krahinor i Lidhjes së Komunistëve (LK) të Serbisë për Kosovë e Metohi (Kosovo Archives. Holding: Regional Committee of the Communist League), g. 3, k 2a/40, year 1967.

20 Dokument nga Arkivi i Kosovës (Documents from the archive of Kosovo). Në: *Buletini informativ* (Informative Bulletin). Pristina, September 1968. The issue of the national flag had become a symbol of the political movement of Albanians in Yugoslavia, for the realization of their national rights. Entire generations of the national political movement had decided to fanatically defend and legalize the use of the national flag.

21 N. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, 327-347.

of Albanian lands with the mother country, Albania, as was envisaged in the National Program of the Albanian Democrats²², or in the political and national program of Adem Demaçi and Metush Krasniqi.²³

In the political program of the Revolutionary Movement for the Union of Albanians, designed by Adem Demaçi with other patriots, in Article 1 was stated: „The first and the last aim of our movement is the provision of the right to self-determination, up to disconnection of the largely Albanian inhabited areas, that are still under the administration of Yugoslavia, that is, the first and the last goal of our movement is the liberation of Albanian provinces annexed by Yugoslavia and the union of these provinces with their motherland, Albania.”²⁴

Due to the bitter experience of the past, being deeply convinced that the Yugoslav political class would not provide a solution for the national question in Kosovo, which would be in accordance with the requirements of Albanians, the national patriotic forces had managed to sublime their political action by organizing demonstrations in November 1968, where they made public their positions and their political and national demands.²⁵

The early '70s brought a again positive climate of relaxation in the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia. This climate is visible in the conversation held on August 24, 1973, at the reception that the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, Adil Çarçani, made to the President of the Executive Council of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, Ilija Vakić and to the Yugoslav ambassador in Albania Jovan Pejčinović. On this occasion, Adil Çarçani had said:

„Both our nations have been and are for peace. They have struggled for centuries to protect their freedom and independence ... It is in the interest of our two peoples to have friendship among us, peace and not war and to develop relationships on a justice basis. This is not only the desire of the people, but also our government has always declared that we are on the side of the Yugoslav people and want Yugoslavia to be strong and independent (...) Comrade Enver has declared that if the independence of the Yugoslav people will be touched upon, the Albanian people will be with them and will help to protect it and himself. So, it concerns all of us and in particular diplomats to apply this right policy.”²⁶

Albania and Yugoslavia had already achieved some important agreements in the field of education, economy, scholarly exchange and in some other areas. In recent years, Albania had engaged to a large extent of people from the science and culture networks to help Kosovo achieve a greater educational progress. Therefore, from 1968 until March 1981, a high quality of good relations between the two countries, in particular, between Kosovo and Albania was achieved.

During this period when constitutional amendments in Kosovo were being approved, Albania closely monitored these processes by taking open stance for its support. In a document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania, in 1972, setting tasks for Kosovo, for the year 1973, among other things, it is stated:

„to pursue with particular attention discussions for the approval of new amendments to the constitution of Kosovo and to encourage the Kosovars to not withdraw from their struggle for the realization of constitutional rights, independently from the circumstances or other influences.”²⁷

At this stage of political relations between Albania and Yugoslavia, Albania was quite prudent to strengthen these relations further to relax relations between the two countries, and to use this form of action,

22 *Pretencë kundër Halim Spahisë dhe anëtarëve të tjerë të Komitetit Qendror të Organizatës Nacional Demokratike. (Pretence against Halim Spahia and other members of the Central Committee of the National Democratic Organization). Arkivi i Kosovës. Fondi: Prokuroria Publike e Kosovës dhe Metohisë, K. Nr. 99/45, 11 shtator 1945, Gjyqi Krahinuer i Kosovës dhe Metohisë, Prizren. (Kosovo Archives. Holding: Public Prosecution of Kosovo and Metohia K. Nr. 99/45, 11 September 1945. Provincial Court of Kosovo and Metohia). Prizren.*

23 *Aktgjykimi kundër Metush Krasniqit dhe anëtarëve të tjerë të Parisë Revolucionare për Bashkimin e Tokave Shqiptare me Shtetin Amë. (Judgement against Metush Krasniqi and other members of the Revolutionary Party about the union of the Albanian territories with the mother state.) Arkivi i Kosovës. Fondi: Gjykata e Qarkut në Gjiilan, K.nr. 19/59. (Kosovo Archives. Holding: Court of the district of Gjiilan)*

24 *Programi i LRBSH-së tek Dossier Demaçi. Arkivi i Kosovës. Fondi: Gjyqi i Qarkut Prishtinë. (Program of the Revolutionary Movement for the Unity of the Albanians (LRBSH) in the Dossier of Demaci. Kosovo Archives. Holding: Court of the district of Kosovo).*

25 *Aktgjykimi kundër Osman Dumoshit dhe anëtarëve të tjerë të Grupit të rinjve të LRBSH-së, 7 prill 1969. Arkivi i Kosovës. Fondi: Gjykata e Qarkut Prishtinë, 7 prill 1969 (Judgement against Osman Dumoshi and other members of the youth group of the Revolutionary Movement for the Unity of the Albanians, henceforth LRBSH, 7 April 1969. Kosovo Archives. Holding: Court of the District Pristina).*

26 Arkivi Qendror Shtetëror, Tiranë [Albanian States Archives, henceforth: AQSH], holding 890, 1973, dossier 230, 54.

27 Arkivi i Ministrisë së Punëve të Jashtme [Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, henceforth: AMPJ], year 1972, dossier b8/2, no. 636, 10.

that Kosovo could gain more legal rights under the Yugoslav Federation. Therefore, at this time Albania made political maneuvering to 'patch' relations with the Yugoslavs,²⁸ even though, as stated in the letters of Yugoslav ambassador in Tirana, in 1980: „Albania is more willing to cooperate in the educational, scientific, cultural and sportive aspects, [better with a village inhabited by Albanians everywhere in Yugoslavia, than with a Yugoslav republic or province, where there is no Albanian population.”²⁹

Therefore, the relaxation of relations between Albania and Yugoslavia made possible that the political movement in Kosovo presented its political platform, in order for Kosovo to reach a higher constitutional advancement.

Albania's attitude towards Kosovo's political movement in the 1960

In the early '60s, Albania was more active on the issue of Kosovo. Albania had already laid as a political platform for her political and state institutions duties to deal with the issue of Kosovo. Developments were taking place in Kosovo. There was a continuous demand of the illegal movement directed to Albania to ask for support. This pushed Albania into a building a strategy of action which was not much different from previous years neither in action nor in ideology. Nevertheless, we find this support more systematic and much better organized by the state organs.

Although in a situation of strained international relations, when the pressure to establish relationships and to accept pacts and peace in the Balkans had reached an added value, it remained consistent in its actions in relation to the issue of Kosovo. Now, she changed the form of action, by getting more deeply engaged in giving directions, and also in getting opened to criticism of illegal political movement in Kosovo. In some cases, we see that Enver Hoxha had erred in creating concepts and alliances to solve the Kosovo issue.

Therefore, this period is characterized by the intensity of the PLA's relations with Albanian political groups in emigration and within Kosovo. These relations with Albanian political groups and organizations in exile were of a 'top secret' character. Instructions and information with them were almost illegal. Nevertheless, the liaison structures of the Albanian state were expanded and the work directions numerous. Here we stop at some of them:

1. One of the priority functions of the diplomatic representation of the Albanian state was the mediation, orientation, and organization of the political structures of Kosovo Albanians in exile;³⁰
2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs operated as a special directorate which closely observed the political developments in Kosovo and also Belgrade's policy towards Kosovo. This directorate prepared for the Central Committee (CC) of Albanian Party of Labor (APL) an informative periodical bulletin about Kosovo, which had a „top secret” character;³¹
3. In the Ministry of the Interior, there was a special department, which had organized structures to get in touch and to relate to political groups of Albanians in Kosovo and in the West in order to get to know closely the situation and also Yugoslav agents' penetration.³²
4. In the CC of the APL, there was a special sector called the „Kosovo Sector” with had the following tasks:
 - a. to observe the political situation, the activity of state bodies and that of socio-political organizations, the relations with national structures in Kosovo and in other Albanian territories under Yugoslavia, that are connected and have an impact on the national situation of Albanians in Yugoslavia;
 - b. to know better the national-chauvinist policy, applied in the economic area, in the living standards and in the economic situation of the Albanian population in Yugoslavia;
 - c. to guard the educational and cultural situation of the Albanian population in Yugoslavia, the policy applied in this field, the activity of scientific institutions, literature, arts, cinematography, etc.;
 - d. to observe the state and activity of the Kosovo economic and political immigrants, of patriotic and revolutionary organizations, as seen in close connection with the resistance and the implementation of the Kosovo people's requirements in a democratic way;

28 AMPJ, year 1970, dossier b7/2d, no. 581, 7.

29 Begzad Baliu, *Marrëdhëniet arsimore dhe shkencore jugosllavo-shqiptare në prag të demonstratave të year 1981*. (Yugoslav-Albanian educational and scholarly relations at the eve of the demonstrations of 1981). Conference: *Demonstratat e year 1981* (Demonstrations of the year 1981). Prishtinë: Instituti Albanologjik i Prishtinës, 2011, 14.

30 AQSH, holding 10/AP, year 1966, dossier 171.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

- e. in collaboration with other sectors of the Central Committee, it would assist in the development and implementation of guidelines of the party and the tasks that different institutions had towards Kosovo and other Albanian territories in Yugoslavia;
- f. to be in connection and to watch the problems that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that of the Interior had on issues related to the operational tasks of the state;
- g. to maintain contacts and to cooperate with other institutions, whose task was to study and know the situation and to develop propaganda towards Kosovo, about those fundamental problems concerning the operational tasks of the sector without duplicating or replacing
- h. the sector responsible for knowing the state in Kosovo would use the press and other necessary publications, and the information that would come from the Albanian foreign representations, from the Ministry of Interior and all other possible sources.³³

In accordance with the operational duties and norms in power, this sector carried these documents and evidences: data files; regular index about the state and activity of patriotic and revolutionary organizations, the necessary documents and literature that regarded the issue of Albanians in Yugoslavia, information, reports, studies, that the sector for the party leadership produced, etc.³⁴

The Albanian Radio-Television was committed to program, to buy, to create special programs on radio and television about the Kosovo Albanians. ART program had to be approved by the Central Committee of APL.

5. The University of Tirana had to program every year publications, lectures, etc., for the Kosovo Albanians.
6. The same task was a must also for the Academy of Sciences of Albania.
7. Along the trade, foreign trade enterprises had specific duties for meetings and exchanges with the Albanians in Kosovo.³⁵

Speaking about the period after World War II, in 1966, Enver Hoxha stated that „after liberation and ‘self-determination’ Titists put their administration in Kosovo, created repressive apparatuses, prepared their quads, organized their party, their propaganda and began to well-known slaughter under the guise of barbaric chauvinism.”³⁶

Meanwhile, considering the way to resistance and war against extermination, Enver Hoxha wrote that „the Albanian people of Kosovo are protected formally, politically or openly by the Albanian state.”³⁷ The support was seen in two directions: „The first direction was the heroic struggle against *Titoites*, while the second course was open bold support, protecting Kosovo Albanians.”³⁸

Enver Hoxha had to the idea that by debunking the Yugoslav regime policy, by diminishing the image of Yugoslavia, he would manage to prevent the actions against the Albanians and the Yugoslav state and in some cases to push the Yugoslav state to be more careful with the actions it wanted to take over Kosovo. However, Hoxha saw the solution of the question of Albanians in Yugoslavia from another viewpoint and from other forms of action, which the illegal political movement in Kosovo could not fully accept at that time and under those circumstances to be their platform of actions.

While analyzing the struggle of the Albanians of Kosovo, Enver Hoxha expressed some of its shortcomings, such as the following:

*„1. Kosovo Albanian war for democratic rights was not organized, 2. It was guided, 3. It is politically and organizationally loose, 4. It follows with little sensitivity the old prewar features, coming up with slogans „War to join Albania”, 5. It allowed mass emigration of Albanians to Turkey and did not organize the work so that Albanians would not leave the lands of their ancestors, 6. It allowed the sale of the Albanian lands to Serbs, 7. There was not enough resistance to win over the conjuncture that Titoism was forced to allow with the opening of Albanian schools, 8. The fight took place in secret groups, which had no secrets for the UDB, 9. War did not take sufficient account of other peoples’ fight in Yugoslavia, 10. Absence of a Marxist Leninist leadership to break the waves and use situations and conjunctures.”*³⁹

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 *Original documents about actiyeares of the 5, 6, 7 and 8 bullets* are conserved in AQSH, holding 10/AP, year 1966, dossier 171.

36 AQSH, holding 10/AP, year 1966, dossier 185, 12.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., 1-15.

In this period, Enver Hoxha thought „the issue of Kosovo is not easy, nor cannot be resolved as quickly as some Kosovo people might believe in good faith.”⁴⁰ In terms of fulfilling the objectives for resolving the political status of Kosovo, he said that „ it cannot be determined, because does not depend on the good wishes”.⁴¹ According to the political platform of the Albanian leadership, the struggle for the liberation of Kosovo and that of the Albanians in Yugoslavia was seen within the space of the Yugoslav state, because the policy of the leadership of Albania was not ready to accept that Kosovo war would break the boundaries of Yugoslavia.

Enver Hoxha wrote „the people of Kosovo must understand that in these conjunctures, Albania can never attack Yugoslavia. PRA can never be an aggressor. If Yugoslavia would attack Albania that is another problem: Albania will protect itself, will fight and win and the Kosovo problem will be put into a different light.”⁴²

On the question whether there should be an armed conflict, Enver Hoxha argued against it, denouncing it as a fatal error. „Such a thing cannot bring any success without waiting too long. Neither individual courage nor bravery would suffice. Revolution is one of the most serious issues, and needs to be prepared.”⁴³

The Albanian leadership continued to see the Kosovo war closely related to the Yugoslav peoples' war and in the 'brotherhood' with them, because isolated war of Albania against Yugoslavia would be in their opinion a suicide.⁴⁴ According to the Albanian leadership, one has to prepare also the profit from the given situations. First of all, democratic rights should be strengthened.⁴⁵ Enver Hoxha considered that „the Albanian leadership in Kosovo was sold to Titoism that is why they are chauvinist plus revisionist Albanians. They should not be trusted, but one has to seek for the weaknesses in order to make them stumble.”⁴⁶

It was too illusory to think at that time that Albanians along with other peoples of Yugoslavia and with their support would resolve the issue of Kosovo, knowing that in this time the Yugoslav Federation and its republics had managed to overcome contradictions between themselves and that Tito had spread his influence in all the structures of the Yugoslav state and his prestige in the Western bloc was high.

In terms of propaganda Albania never stopped its activities around the criticism addressed to the Yugoslav regime and leadership. In some cases, we see from the documents that Enver Hoxha sent addressed harsh criticism towards the Kosovar leadership and then sought feedback on the effects of that critic in relation to the Kosovar leadership. He wanted to understand the closeness of this leadership with the Federative leadership.⁴⁷ In the ideological war against Yugoslavia, Enver Hoxha used even the element of poverty and discriminatory policies that the Yugoslav Federation applied towards the economic development of Kosovo.

On 16 November 1967, Enver Hoxha wrote an article entitled „The Titoist Demagoguery cannot cover the opened wounds of Kosovo.” The target was the disclosure of Titoite demagoguery on the economic and cultural politics by making comparisons with the situation in other republics of Yugoslavia. In 1967, the difference between Kosovo and other developed areas of Yugoslavia were deepened. Slovenia's national income was 7588 new dinars, while in Kosovo the income was 730 dinars, which was the average of the year in Yugoslavia.⁴⁸ Enver Hoxha linked this disproportion with the discriminatory line of the Titoist policy and with the chauvinistic treatment of Kosovo only as a resource of raw materials, as an area of colonial oppression about the unskilled surplus forces of Serbia and Montenegro.⁴⁹

Enver Hoxha called that period of time the “relative quietness imposed by internal crises and conjunctures that Tito regime made, while ‘the cultural liberalism’ in Kosovo, as fraudulent or dangerous maneuvers that warned that Titoites were planning some new tragedy to destroy the Albanian nationality”.⁵⁰

The Albanian party and scientific leadership took Kosovo Albanians war under its protection, as well as that of the Albanians in Montenegro and Macedonia, because

40 Ibid., 16.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., 19.

47 AQSH, holding 10/AP, year 1970-1971, dossier no.387/1, 1.

48 AQSH, holding 10/AP, year 1967, dossier no. 19, 15.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid., 17.

„they are fully entitled to fight with persistence and determination, to make all the migrants within and outside Yugoslavia return in their country. They have legal, moral and historical rights to demand freedom for their homes from the Serb and Montenegrin colonies. They have the right to speak and write freely their mother tongue, to have a school system, press, and literature in Albanian language, to have libraries, theaters, and research institutes for the dissemination of their national culture, to have their administration composed of Albanians, people chosen by people and not imposed by the Titoites. They have the right to fight against robbery and exploitation and use for their own interests.”⁵¹

During this period the official political stance of Enver Hoxha distinguished extensively from the attitude and the political platform of the illegal movement in Kosovo. While the latter persistently sought more advanced modalities for resolving the issue of Albanians in Yugoslavia and through various forms, Albania was much more cautious and required that at that time the issue be resolved through an enhanced political autonomy. According to Enver Hoxha, thus, tasks were limited within the framework of the expansion of democratic rights to an expanded autonomy.⁵²

The Demand for the Republic of Kosovo and Albania Attitude

On November 27, 1968, in Pristina and in some other towns of Kosovo, as well as Macedonia, for the first time it was publicly asked, through demonstrations organized by the national movement of the time, that Kosovo becomes a republic. Apart from the main demand of the Republic of Kosovo, in those demonstrations other requirements were also raised, such as: „We want self-determination up to secession”, „We want union of the Albanian inhabited territories with Kosovo”, „We want Our Constitution”, „We want Our University” etc.⁵³

The demonstrations of 1968 reflected their impact on several directions.⁵⁴ In relation to the Yugoslav Federation, they accelerated the process of constitutional changes that in some form came at the time of the great conflict between Tito’s political line and that of Rankovic , in which Tito managed to utilize these events in favor of war against the political line of Rankovic.

These events showed once again that the issue of Albanians in Yugoslavia had resulted in no acceptable solution; therefore, constitutional changes were needed.

The demonstrations of 1968 were also reflected in the position of Albanians in Macedonia. In a document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania, speaking about this effect it was stated:

„It must be said that the events of November and December 1968 caused some stirrings among the Macedonian leadership and out of the fear of further consequences, they found themselves forced to make some concessions. For this reason, Krste Crvenkovski, the former president of the League of Communists of Macedonia and Angel Čemerski, the current president of the League of Communists of Macedonia, have occasionally participated in the political units of the towns Diber, Tetovo and Gostivar, in which they were obliged to speak also about the rights of Albanians in Macedonia, about their language, flag and culture. In the political unit of Diber, on October 5, 1970, talking about equality between nations and nationalities, Angel Čemerski boasted with the rights given broadly to Albanians.”⁵⁵

Among Albanians in Macedonia one could feel a great patriotic movement going on and a continuous work for the union of the Albanian municipalities with Kosovo, or at least to make Kosovo be recognized as a political, economic, cultural and educational center of Albanians in Yugoslavia.⁵⁶ In this context, the 1968 demonstrations prompted the policy of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia , as well as that of the Yugoslav Federation to review their politics towards Albanians.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., 19-20.

53 *Aktgjykimi kundër Osman Dumoshit dhe anëtarëve të tjerë të Grupit të të rinjve të LRBSH-së, 7 prill 1969*. Arkivi i Kosovës. Fondi: *Gjykata e Qarkut Prishtinë, 7 prill 1969*. (Judgement against Osman Dumoshi and other members of the youth group of LRBSH, 7 April 1969. Kosovo Archive. Holding: Court of the district of Pristina, 7 April 1969).

54 *Mbledhja e Tretë e Komitetit Krahinor të LK të Kosovës e Metohisë, Prishtinë, 9. 12. 1968*. Arkivi i Kosovës, 09 dhjetor 1968 (Third Meeting of the Regional Committee of LK of Kosovo and Metohia. Prishtine, 9.12.1968. Kosovo Archives, 9 December 1968)

55 AMPJ, year 1971, dossier no. 643, 14.

56 Ibid.

The Yugoslav politics was entrapped by these events, to the point that the head of the Yugoslav Federation, Tito, in a press conference with foreign journalists tried to present these events as mere student movements, just like those that were occurring in some European countries.⁵⁷

Even though the Yugoslav press and the Yugoslav politics attempted to put an end to the spread of events that occurred, trying to put them in the light of social discontent, such as student revolt, or as a result of the liberalization of political life in Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavs could not hide the demonstrations. We have at our disposal American documents talking about the political situation in Eastern Europe, especially after the retreat of Albania from the Warsaw Pact. The USSR-Albanian relations after the 1968 events in Kosovo are reported as follows: „Albania did little to remove the long-standing irritant elements in its relations with Yugoslavia. Resumption of Albanian propaganda attacks in October and the riots of the end-November among over 1 million Albanians in the Yugoslav autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija, once more embittered relations of Tirana with Belgrade.”⁵⁸ Such a documents also shows that politics of the U.S. had carefully followed the demonstrations that took place in Kosovo and its influence on the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia and on the whole socialist camp.

In addition to information about these events, it is stated: „the fact that the Kosovo riots occurred on the Day of Independence of Albania, caused speculation that Albanians could have helped spark riots.”⁵⁹

After the demonstrations of 1968, the Yugoslav indirectly accused Albania as an external factor. The international community also considered Albania as a country which could have encouraged the demonstrations of 1968 due to its anti-Yugoslavian attitude and her protection of the Albanian rights in Yugoslavia. Furthermore in this document it is mentioned the way how Albania could have had an impact: „Perhaps through such steps such as the editorial of ‘Voice of the People’ on November 24, in which it was sharply condemned the „violent repression”, the „unparalleled economic exploitation” and the „deportation and genocide against the Albanian minority. These developments made the future of Yugoslav-Albanian relations completely unpredictable.”⁶⁰

Even in relation to U.S.A. policy, the demonstrations of 1968 raised curiosity about their multidimensional radiation. Nevertheless, it failed to create and express a consistent position about the politics of Albania on the demonstrations of 1968 and the requirements presented in those demonstrations. As a matter of fact, they were doing a great propaganda in support of the rights of Albanians in Yugoslavia concerning their rights to language, culture, education, human rights. Concerning the status Kosovo, they seemed a bit more reserved, and in some cases they expressed confusion and contradictory views.

The politics of the Albanians estimated that the events occurring in Kosovo at this time would be used to destabilize peace in the Balkans and for the possible intervention of the ‘imperialist’ and ‘social-imperialist’ states in Yugoslavia, and that this would have an impact on the security issues and sovereignty of Albania.

In many documents, which reflect the political views of the Albanian state, the main issue was the future of the Yugoslav state, whether it would be occupied by the Russians or by the Americans. In such circumstances, what would become of Albania: would be the integrity of the state be endangered? This was the reason, why even in the most important developments, which in a way were in favor of resolving the national question, she was withdrawn and positioned to maintain the status quo.

On December 5, 1968, Enver Hoxha stated in some of his writings the position of the Albanian state. Initially, Hoxha said that „on November 27 in Pristina and in many other cities in Kosovo, demonstrations of the students took place.”⁶¹ He proceeded „According to official reports, one was killed⁶² and many of the UDB, who attacked demonstrators and also demonstrators who defended themselves were killed.”⁶³ The Yugoslav State considered the demonstrations as organized by Albanian young people, who were called enemies and inspired by foreign.⁶⁴ In response to this indirect accusation, Enver Hoxha continued to keep the line of non-interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. He wrote: „of course we have not even the

57 E. Hoxha, *op. cit.*, 327.

58 *Memorandum i Thomas L. Hughes dërguar Departamentit të shtetit, sektorit të inteligjencës dhe kërkimit, 2 janar 1969.* National Archives and Record Administration [Memorandum of Thomas L. Hughes sent to the State Department, sector of Intelligence and Research, 2 January 1969. Henceforth: NARA], Fondi: *Departamenti i Shtetit* (Holding: State Department).

59 *Ibid.*

60 *Ibid.*

61 AQSH, holding 10/AP, year 1968, dossier no. 238, 1.

62 In the demonstrations of November 27, 1968 in Pristina, the 17-years-old student Murat Mehmeti, from Pristina was killed.

63 AQSH, holding 10/AP, year 1968, dossier no. 238, 1.

64 *Ibid.*, 1-2.

slightest finger at these demonstrations. We did not conduct any intelligence service or subversive work neither in Yugoslavia, nor in Kosovo. Titoites know this, but they want to speculate.”⁶⁵ The pro-Albanian slogans presented by Enver Hoxha attributed to „provokers inserted into the ranks of the demonstrators, in order to put another color to demonstrations.”⁶⁶ Enver Hoxha expressed openly his opinion on the issue of Kosovo, as a matter of national rights.⁶⁷ He argued this attitude with the Belgrade’s position towards Greek Macedonians, where „Tito declared that it is their right to protect the Macedonians of Greece, while Tirana should have no right to defend the Albanian demonstrators, and their protection he called a crime.”⁶⁸

In the view of the Albanian leadership, these demonstrations showed that “Tito- Ranković regime failed to suppress with terror the national patriotic movement of the Albanians in Yugoslavia. After the fall of Ranković, Tito was forced to make several concessions, and the Albanians managed to gain something, but they are still oppressed.”⁶⁹

Albania’s hesitation towards the activity of the Kosovo National Movement

Political movements were organized by the patriotic forces in this period, with sublimated demands to unite the Albanian territories under Yugoslavia in one republic and to join the occupied Albanian territories to Albania.⁷⁰ The political circles in Albania, had perceived these moves with great dilemma about what could happen further. Fear and suspicion that these movements were conspiracy of the Yugoslav secret services or reactionary-bourgeoisie forces was constantly expressed.

This fear logic had a basis, because Belgrade had built such structures within Kosovo through political opponents of Albanian regime.⁷¹ This fact is also based on a document of the Albanian legation in Belgrade addressed to the political institutions of the Albanian state. The Albanian legation in Belgrade had received a request from the patriotic group of Kosovo to get support from Albanian state in order to continue the fight for the liberation of Kosovo. It also asked for guidance on how to precede the work and how to walk with the time.

In the response given to the Albanian legation in Belgrade by the special department of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs it was stated:

“Our Legation in Belgrade informs us on September 19, 1968 that frequently Kosovo-Albanians show up to require that „taking advantage of the current situation in the People’s Republic of Albania, she should provide comprehensive assistance to Kosovars to realize their aspirations for secession from Yugoslavia and to unite with Albania.”⁷²

The document also states “The Legation expressed no doubts on these people, but requires that the Ministry instructs its representatives about the right attitude that should be given to the Kosovars, because there are no precise guidelines”.⁷³

“*We think*, – it was stated in the answer of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, - *that our comrades of the Legate have no right to trust a-priori Kosovars, who present requirements of such a nature, so we think to give these instructions: be vigilant against those who raise such claims. Keep in mind that we do not present formal territorial claims against Yugoslavia, because we do not separate the solution of the Kosovo problem from the solution of the general problem of Yugoslavia, namely the collapse of Titoist clique and restoration of the Marxist- Leninist leadership. In the context of solving the national question in Yugoslavia, this leadership would give the Albanian population the right to self-determination with plebiscite. In this sense, the Albanian population has to support the eventual Marxist-Leninist Yugoslav forces to achieve their goals.*”⁷⁴

65 Ibid., 2-3.

66 Ibid., 4.

67 Ibid., 4-5.

68 Ibid., 5-6.

69 Ibid. 8.

70 Ethem Çeku, *Mendimi politik i lëvizjes ilegale në Kosovë 1945-1981; Brezi '81* (Political Thought of the Illegal Movement in Kosovo 1945-1981; Generation 81). Prishtinë, 2004; *ibid.*: *Shekulli i ilegales, Brezi '81* (The Century of Illegality, Generation 81). Prishtinë, 2004.

71 NARA, Holding: State Department, 6 July 1953.

72 Arkivi Qendror Shtetëror, Ministria e Punëve të Jashtme, [State Central Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, henceforth: AQSH., MPJ], year 1968, dossier b/7-2/b, no. 360, 1-2.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

In that document it was clearly stated: “Our position towards Yugoslavia and the Kosovo issue has not changed in this situation. We advise the Kosovars to fight just like until now to gain more rights in all directions, aiming to reach to enjoy the same rights that other nationalities enjoy in Yugoslavia.”⁷⁵

Also, in the above mentioned document it was stated: „with regard to the issue whether we want a republic or an autonomous province, you have the guidelines. Again, we do not agree on the creation of the Republic, because it would not solve the problem. It (the problem) will only be resolved as it was said above.”⁷⁶

In 1968, Albania openly expressed its unwillingness to enter into (a) more dynamic developments about the political status of Kosovo. “When visitors, whoever they might be, ask our opinion to the issue of whether to create or not the Republic of Kosovo, you should not let them understand our positions, but you say that they have to decide on this issue on their own.”⁷⁷ Pursuing this way of speaking, you should say: „In our opinion, it is important that you earn the more rights and fight to enjoy the same rights that other nationalities in Yugoslavia enjoy. For this, you have had and will always have the support of the People’s Republic of Albania.”⁷⁸

The official policy of the Albanian leadership of that time, in relation to national patriotic movement was not always consistent and principled. In some cases, it was deeply ideological and at times even contradictory and negative. On various occasions, it seems more preoccupied with the consequences that the new political and legal status of Kosovo would bring, and respectively with its impact on relation to the Yugoslav Federation, and other republics of Yugoslavia, and would course would Yugoslavia follow after these dramatic developments in this part of Europe.

Referring to a document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania, at the time, we quote:

*“The demand for an autonomous republic of Kosovo began to find place even in the provincial press, supporting completely this requirement. Many articles published for this purpose give data and figures about the population of the republics of Yugoslavia, their national composition, and so forth. Indirectly, question arises e.g. why Montenegro, or Macedonia which have respectively 2.8 % and 6.6 % of the population of Yugoslavia and a national population of respectively 72 % and 71 %, are republics, whereas Kosovo which has 5.2 % of the total Yugoslav population Yugoslavia with 74 % of its population Albanian, is not a republic, but an autonomous region?”*⁷⁹

In that document it is further stated:

*“The requirements of the Albanian people of Kosovo affected not only the interests of the three republics of Yugoslavia, bordering the Kosovo province, which have within their borders large territories with Albanian population. They also pose a danger to the whole Yugoslav federal system. Therefore with all the great promises given to Kosovo, Tito took measurements to stop these requests, because their fulfillment would jeopardize the position of Tito himself.”*⁸⁰

From this document it is clear that the Albanian government also troubled by the implications that the requirements of Albanians in Yugoslavia would cause, while regarding the fate of the Yugoslav leadership and the fragile relations between the Yugoslav republics.

After careful review of the documents of the time, it can be concluded that according to the official Albanian policy, three prominent political lines were presented in Kosovo and in other Albanian areas under Yugoslavia: Firstly, sound patriotic forces of Kosovo Albanians, who saw in concrete terms that their demand for the creation of separate republic and its unity within all Albanian lands could not be realized in the situation present in Yugoslavia. They tried all they could to gain as much right for national equality and to escape the Serbian dependency through their new constitution.⁸¹ With these forces was joined the Kosovo leadership that faithfully served of Tito.

The second force that fought that Kosovo province would not be given more rights than it had, were Serbian-Montenegrin chauvinist forces in Kosovo.⁸² Third stream was represented by Albanians, who having not fairly assessed the internal situation of Yugoslavia, were positioned publicly against the platform of the Communist League of Kosovo and considered those rights given by the Constitution to the Albanian

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 AMPJ, year 1969, dossier b/7-2/b, no. 461, 2.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid., 3.

82 Ibid.

populace of Kosovo as very few and insufficient.⁸³ The views of this group were condemned by Kosovo's leaders, and their requirements were called unrealistic and made on tendentious purposes.⁸⁴ In reality, both these political concepts for autonomy and Serbian-Montenegrin were always minor. The concept of the independence of Kosovo, accompanied according to circumstances, with elements of the Republic, was as a matter of fact, the dominating and the most favorite concept for the majority of Kosovo Albanians. From what was above mentioned, it results that the policy of the Albanian state in that period was overly focused within the political conjuncture of created circumstances. The undertaking of whatever possible step outside those conjunctures was viewed through ideological optics. Enver Hoxha and some Albanian state structures, especially people of informative services overstated the ideological war, as an opportunity and tremendously effective tool against Tito's Yugoslavia. Enver Hoxha's speeches and political statements in some events surpassed the domestic political propaganda. Therefore, the treated documents and international events that occurred in 1968 and the major political movements in several republics of Yugoslavia led Albania into a very scary position about its own safety.

Albania's Attitude to Events in Yugoslavia in the Early '70s

At some stages after World War II, Yugoslavia had gone through some serious political crisis such as The conflict with Stalin, the Brion Plenum; the events in Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia,⁸⁵ the fight against Croatian armed groups etc., led Yugoslav Federation to take serious political blow. All these events that took place in Yugoslavia, the opposing military-political blocs such as the NATO and the Warsaw Tractate, kept up with great care, sending their fleets at the Adriatic coast.⁸⁶ The two superpowers had their spheres of political interest in Yugoslavia. Since the Yalta Conference, these interests had remained unchanged.

Meanwhile, the Albanian government watched carefully into details the processes taking place in Yugoslavia, commenting them mainly according to their ideological principles and looking at the implications of these events in relation to Albania and Kosovo. The same happened with her attitude towards events in Croatia in 1971, when the Croatian mass movement known as 'MASPOK' occurred.⁸⁷ It received large dimensions for the time being, because it was an organized movement against the centralist tendencies of the Yugoslav Federation. This very powerful movement of Croats in essence aimed at the Croatian independency from the Yugoslav Federation.⁸⁸

Albanians in the occupied territories in Yugoslavia supported this political movement. It should be noted especially the massive participation of Albanian students, who were studying at that time at the University of Zagreb. In all anti-federalist movements, which led to the weakening or destruction of the Yugoslav Federation, Albanians from all their occupied territories participated along those who were fighting the Yugoslav state. The Albanian official policy, however, was at all costs seeking through various channels that Albanians from occupied territories would stay away from such conflicts. They praised the Kosovo politics and Kosovo press of that time that did not support and did not give enough space to the events in Croatia. In a document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania, it was clear Albania great interest in these events,⁸⁹ which could have an impact on state Albanian-Yugoslav relations, but also the possibility that they could be used by Serbs to suppress Kosovo Albanians.⁹⁰

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Dušan Bilandžić, *Historija Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije. Glavni procesi 1918-1985*. Zagreb: Školska Knjiga, 1985; Branko Petranović, Momčilo Zečević, *Jugoslavija 1918-1984*. Zbirka dokumenata. RAD. /Rezolucija Informacionog Biroa Komunističke Partije o stanju u KPJ, 28 juni 1948/. Beograd, 1985, 942-947.

86 E. Hoxha, *op. cit.*, 319-324.

87 MASPOK, abbreviation for the Croat words '*masovni pokret*', which means 'massive movement'. This movement had its center in the publishing house "*Matica Hrvatska*", from where meetings were organised which articulated political and economic requests of the Croats. Through its newspapers and magazines "*Matica Hrvatska*" it encouraged nationalist disposal. Later it started to create its branches also in factories, in which it reflected the employment policies on national basis; it presented the politics of Yugoslavia as a prison for Croatia, the politics of the economic expoition of the Yugoslav Federation towards Croatia and insisted asking the creation of the independent Croat state.

88 Zdravko Vuković, 587.

89 AMPJ, year 1978, dossier b7/2, no. 1366, 2-3.

90 Ibid.

Immediately after constitutional changes, Serbs in Belgrade began with huge reactions, trying to exploit the events in Croatia in order to summon the meeting of the Presidency of the Communist League of Yugoslavia. As it was summoned about Croatia, now it was called about Kosovo.⁹¹ The events that occurred in Slovenia, Croatia and in Serbia and the depressive state in the Balkans had driven the Albanian state to be extremely careful in this great political vortex. She wanted to keep the political movement of the Albanians in Yugoslavia away from these political developments that were taking place in the Yugoslav Federation. Possible implications of the official leadership of Kosovo and the illegal movement increased the possibility of the action of chauvinistic nationalist forces in Serbia to attack Kosovo.

Kosovo in the ideological war of Albania

Political systems and states change their policies, mainly due to the shift of the balance between political, economic, and military forces. In its foreign policy, Albania had designed an ideological war against Yugoslavia. She attempted and believed that through this war she would manage to help resolve the issue of Albanians in Yugoslavia. She kept her ideological line of Inform-biro fanatically against Yugoslavia.⁹² Albania was convinced that it would come the time when the constellation of forces would change in her favor. Therefore, it persistently carried the flag as a key ideological line and as a philosophy to solve all the problems that the Albanian nation was facing.⁹³ The overestimation of the ideological factor in facing Yugoslavia, from the side of the official policy of Albania, in reality was an expression of helplessness and inability of the Albanian state to do more on the issue of Kosovo in certain periods. On the other hand, it should be noted that Albania for many reasons and historical circumstances was in many segments not equal to Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia had emerged from the war with a huge advantage in terms of military, economic, and political power. It had built more advanced international relations and more durable than Albania, and the international factor had generally larger interests in Yugoslavia than in Albania.

Undoubtedly the game of Yugoslavia with „two gates” in the early 1950s, made it a valued player, wanted by the international community. Consequently, the disadvantage of Albania to Yugoslavia was deepening. Tito’s Yugoslavia won other positive value in the eyes of the world, especially by the winning role of the ‘Non-Aligned’ and the policy of non-involvement in two major bands formatted during the Cold War.

Albanian leaders tried to improve its image by using in a large scale mode the ideological war against Yugoslavia. Open calls to overthrow the regime of Tito and the Yugoslav League of Communists as an anti-Marxist organization were a constant means in the political struggle against Yugoslavia from Albania’s communist leadership. These calls for fall of Tito from his power were not seen with positive eyes by the great powers of the time and did not find political support.

Enver Hoxha, himself, at least officially, saw the resolution of the Kosovo issue in the light of ideological reflections, and the changes to be made through the highest political structures of the Yugoslav leadership. Related to this, in 1966 among other things, Enver Hoxha said: “National minorities have to follow the right revolutionary path, the path of war against Tito’s clique for the liberation of the peoples of Yugoslavia. Kosovo Albanians should not be misled and abandon this path. This is the only way to their liberation and self-determination.”⁹⁴ Enver Hoxha believed in a possible coalition of the political anti-Titist forces all over

91 Ibid.

92 AMPJ, year 1949, dossier 164, b/8. In a meeting held in November 1949, after the report about the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, given by the representative of the Romanian Labor Party, Georgiu Dezh, a resolution was adopted in which it was stated: a) “The Yugoslav government has openly betrayed the national interests of Yugoslavia and has become a blind means of the agresive politics of the imperialists...; b) The government of Yugoslavia has openly participated in the imperialist camp, standing on the same side with the American reactionists in issues of international importance...; c) in the internal politics the clique Tito-Ranković has managed to dissolve the people’s democratic system, and to establish a policist regime of a fashist type...; d) it has started persecutions and terrorist attacks against true communists, who stay faithful to Marxist-Leninist principles and to internationalisation...; e) therefore the war against the Tito clique was considered by the Informbiro as an international task of the communist parties and its sister-parties, who had to help mostly the working class of Yugoslavia and the working peasants, who in their war are forced to walk in the same way that the communists of those countries are, when the roald to legal issues is closed. As another important task of the communist and labor parties, the question of the multiplication of revolutionary forces is laid ahead and also the eradication of the nationalistic elements...”

93 Talk of the author with the ex-president of Albania, Mr. Ramiz Alia. Tirana, on 22 May 2008.

94 E. Hoxha, *op. cit.*, 146.

Yugoslavia, but the time that was in front of Tito, and the Yugoslav Federation did not allow any possibility of creating such coalitions of the peoples of the Yugoslav federation to make Tito regime collapse. This comes as a result of the contradictions these nations had during World War II. As about the issue of national unity, as a political platform of underground organizations and groups, which in recent years had taken significant dimensions in support of the Albanian territories occupied by Yugoslavia, Enver Hoxha stated: "To fight a war now 'to join Albania' this brings nowhere... Union with Albania has been and is their ideal of life, but to reach this are only two ways: the revolutionary way and the reactionary chauvinist one. The first is the way of war along with the peoples of Yugoslavia, under the leadership of a true Marxist - Leninist party against modern Titoist revisionism for the real liberation and socialism with Yugoslavia. This road leads the Albanian people of Kosovo to the right to self-determination and union with their homeland, Albania; the other way is an adventure. The Kosovo Albanians will become the prey of Yugoslav reaction in this way, even if the fight."⁹⁵

These views of Enver Hoxha, based on the idealistic political philosophy of Marxism - Leninism, were more an effort to find an alibi, than the expression of any real opportunity to resolve the Kosovo issue. The Yugoslav politics used such views of the Albanian leadership to remove the issue of occupation of Albanian lands from the daily agenda and to marginalize it. Displacing their attention from the unsolved question of Kosovo, they focused it on the ideological struggle between the „Yugoslav revisionism” and the „Albanian Marxism – Leninism”.

Seeing these major differences between the two countries and knowing that Albania had no powerful allies that would help resolve the national issue of the enslaved Albanians, Yugoslavia did not enter the ideological conflict, but in most cases it did not respond to the accusations of the official politics, that Tirana was addressing to Belgrade.

In its forms of action, the Yugoslav diplomacy did its best to keep the Albanian diplomacy isolated and without allies. It suffices to mention only the Corfu Channel incident in order to understand how engaged the Yugoslav politics were to ruin the relations between Great Britain and Albania.⁹⁶ Likewise, through bad advice that was served to the new leadership of Albania in 1946, the Yugoslav leadership sabotaged the restoration of diplomatic relations with the United States of America. By the same token, the Yugoslavs did not allow Albania to have direct contacts with the USSR until 1948 and required that its every move goes through Belgrade. Since the end of the war to its dissolution, Yugoslavia continuously invested in increasing internal conflicts within the Albanian politics, in the demolition of Albania's relations with the Western World and in keeping Albania isolated.

To illustrate this, we will emphasize an excerpt from the Yugoslav-Albanian relations. In a meeting between Adil Carçani deputy of Albania, Ilia Vakić, one of the leaders of the Provincial Assembly of Kosovo and Jovan Pejčinović, Yugoslavia's ambassador in Tirana, the latter said: „Our view is that Albania is the uncommitted, just as it is independent outside any treaty. It is in the interest of the Yugoslav people as much as it is in the interest of the Albanian people.”⁹⁷

Therefore, the real exclusion of Albania from the military blocks of time, after 1961, was in fact an act in favor of Yugoslavia because it guaranteed its southern border from any eventual attack. The disengagement of Yugoslavia was also positive for Albanian state, in the same sense. As a matter of fact, Yugoslavia was carrying open political, economic, and diplomatic ties with countries of both political and military blocs. While Albania remained consistent in its traditional policy of not establishing contacts of cooperation with the countries of the blocks.

Although it was officially split with Albania since 1961, Soviet policy sought by means that a big country possessed, mainly through political and military pressure to keep the Albanian politics and economy in a state of tension. The problem of Kosovo remained static out of the inability of Albania to be on several fronts. Besides the 'stick', Soviet policy used also the 'carrot', which left an open door for a return of Albania within the camp of communist countries by taking upon himself the responsibility of a small break in the relations with Albania. In view of this idea, the Soviet Union called from time to time on Albania to restore the diplomatic relations. From the archival documentation of the time, it appears that the Albanian politics and diplomacy had a hard time to successfully cope with the political games of the great powers.⁹⁸

95 Ibid., 147.

96 Miscarriage of justice -The Corfu Channel case. Published by The Albanian Society 26 Cambridge Road, Il for Essex.

97 AMPJ, year 1973, holding 870, dossier 230, 10.

98 AQSH, holding 14/AP, year 1959, dossier 6, d. 1. (19 May 1959).

At various stages, especially after World War II and especially during the Cold War, powerful states implemented dual diplomacy with the smaller countries.⁹⁹ These political and diplomatic games of countries which were under the umbrella of the Warsaw Pact, and in some cases followed also by even Greece and Italy, put the Albanian government into quite difficult and extremely uncomfortable positions. That is why we have to consider Enver Hoxha's political attitudes and also those of the Albanian official policy, under these situations created especially when it came to the Albanian state sovereignty itself, which was constantly threatened.¹⁰⁰

In the complexity of the international context and the policy of isolation that Albania followed, Albania had huge difficulties with its ability to create coalitions in order to support the fight of Albanians in Yugoslavia in order to make their political status advance. In this regard, Enver Hoxha had no consistently strong and demanding attitude to the issue of the Republic of Kosovo. According to his opinion, the Kosovo Albanians should carefully observe the infighting between the republics and the weakening of the position of Serbia, after the fall of Rankovic and see how to benefit the most from this weakness. During this period, he never expressed any support for armed struggle as a possible method for the liberation of Albanian lands. He did not support any form of illegal political movement in Kosovo to move from the position of a peaceful war into an armed struggle. In this way, he, thus, supported more the solution of the problem within the structures of the Yugoslav Federation (up to 1981), which seemed more a result of circumstances rather than any real and consistent definition for or against any solution.

Developing and implementing such policies and attitudes at this time, Albania and its political leadership were not prepared to speak up openly in defense of the request for the Republic of Kosovo.

In his political diary of 1966, Enver Hoxha wrote:

*"We hear talk about a Republic of Kosovo. The Patriotic and revolutionary Kosovars should be very careful in these moments towards Tito revisionists, who could also play the card of supposedly creating a 'Kosovo-Albanian Republic' instead of an autonomous province of Kosovo, in order to cheat the Kosovo chauvinism, in order to suppress easier the Kosovo liberation war and to fight the People's Republic of Albania."*¹⁰¹

The political platform of the underground expressed through the demand for the Republic of Kosovo had nothing to do with 'Kosovo chauvinism'. It was a political doctrine which was carrying away the right of peoples to govern themselves. Enver Hoxha expressed doubt on who would benefit from the Republic of Kosovo and whose political spectrum would it belong to; whether it could be a hearth to challenge his regime or not. Here is how he put the matter:

*"This so-called external Republic of Albania, invented by Titoites could become a center of Kosovo reaction and of the fascist war criminals fleeing from Albanian, that were found in Europe and in the United States of America. Kosovo Albanians should not fall in this trap. They have to fight this dirty maneuver of Titoites who are able to play this card."*¹⁰²

From archival documents, especially those opened during the 90s, we can see that in Russian political circles it was discussed about the use of internal crises in various Balkan countries to overthrow political opponents.¹⁰³ Therefore, finding justifications that a so-called reactionary and bourgeois republic could be created, or a republic which would endanger Albania, was not only alibi to justify the unwillingness, but it was also an expression of risk coverage for his power, as Enver Hoxha almost constantly said that he wanted an ideologically socialist Kosovo, in many respects. According to him, a Kosovo with a similar ideology like

99 About this Vladimir Dedijer stated "that the Soviet government gave often to Albania information that Albania already had, and sometimes even contradictory. According to Dedijer, Stalin was playing big political games between Albania and Yugoslavia, also about the issue of the military divisions of Yugoslavia in Albania in 1948." (Vladimir Dedijer, *Marrëdhëniet jugosllavo-shqiptare 1939-1948* (Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 1939-1948). Tiranë: Meduar, 2005, 933; see also: Rossijski *Gosudarestvenij Arhiv Socialno Politiceskoj Istoriji*. Unpublished documents, recording of the talk between general J.V. Stalin and marshal Tito, on 27 May 1946, 20-23). See also the diary of Enver Hoxha, about the political games of the Soviet Union, in which it is stated that through the Czech representative in Tirana, the Soviet government had warned the Albanian government that Greeks had prepared to attack Albania. (E. Hoxha, *op. cit.*, 513).

100 E. Hoxha, *op. cit.*, 147; Idem. *Rreziku anglo-amerikan për Shqipërinë – Kujtime* (The Anglo-American Danger about Albania). Tiranë: Shtëpia botuese 8 Nëntori, 1982.

101 E. Hoxha, *op. cit.*, 147.

102 Ibid.

103 Memorandum of the talk between the political adviser of the Yugoslav Embassy in USA with the representative of the State Department, on 2 February 1962. United States National Archives [henceforth: USNA], 767.00/2-262.

Albania would be much more acceptable to him. Otherwise, a capitalist Kosovo would actually undermine the power of Enver Hoxha and that of other Albanian leaders, and in this regard also the security of the state.

In his approach to the issue of Albanians in Yugoslavia, Enver Hoxha exploited the politic theory of Communist Internationality that through the concept of a Marxist- Leninist revolution, national issues would also be solved. Enver Hoxha's approach to the collapse of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and its leader Tito from his power and to the establishment of communist structures in Kosovo just like in Albania was in fact a desire to see the Albanians united, also ideologically. This was actually impossible, not only because of the prestige that Yugoslavia had in that period in the Western political world, but also due to the fact that an ideologically intolerant Communism like that in Albania was unacceptable, even by the eastern European socialist world. At the end of the 60s and beginning of the 70s, Yugoslavia had overcome its contradictions with the Soviet Union and had succeeded in getting large aids from the United States of America and from some European countries, becoming thus a country with huge loans from international financial institutions. It was a period when Communism itself had begun to lose pace compared to Western Europe and the United States of America. Therefore, to expect that the solution of the national question of the Albanians in Yugoslavia would come through profound ideological changes in the Yugoslav political spectrum was more a political *Fata Morgana*.

There were also such opinions that considered the ideological struggle of Enver Hoxha from another viewpoint, emphasizing that Hoxha was a nationalist who used the ideological war to establish a higher degree of national feelings of his compatriots. So in the article 'Strange Beijing-Tirana Axis', published in 'The New Leader', on August 6, 1962, P. Moulton Mayer, pointed to such a weakness when he said that the current dispute between Tirana and Belgrade, although it seems as though ideological, is essentially nationalist. It is absurd to believe that Enver Hoxha and his colleagues fight for Marxism - Leninism as if it was a secret thing ... When Albania was actually a Yugoslav protectorate, Tirana had reduced its ardent nationalist feelings so much that when this correspondent asked the present-day Minister of Foreign Affairs of Albania, Behar Shtylla, who fortunately was in New York now taking part in UN session on Kosovo's fate and what can be advisable to raise this issue, Mr. Shtylla said that Albanians and Yugoslavia were friends and that Kosovo would join Albania peacefully.¹⁰⁴

Attitudes of Enver Hoxha and Fadil Hoxha on the issue of Kosovo in the 70s

If we stop at some of the documents of that period, which we should carefully analyze in a comparative way, we can conclude that in some cases we the official stances of Enver Hoxha and that of Yugoslav Communists and their subordinates in Kosovo approximated. In the early '70s, there was a tendency of strengthening the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia. At the same time, Albania attempted at all costs to improve relations with Greece and Turkey, which were and still are countries that were members of NATO pact.¹⁰⁵

After the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia and after Brezhnev's statement of „limited sovereignty”, Albania felt threatened by the possibility of foreign intervention in Albania. In these developments, the diplomacy of the Albanian state tried through its embassy in Belgrade to show cautiousness about the events that took place in Kosovo, especially when these developments had rapid development. Demonstrations of 1968 made Enver Hoxha and his diplomacy understand what was happening in Kosovo and what was the Kosovo politic position in this regard and many other issues.

On September 19, 1970, Enver Hoxha organized a meeting with Lik Seiti, Charge d'Affaires of the PRA in Yugoslavia, in the presence of Ramiz Alia, at the request of the charge for the answer to be given to Fadil Hoxha. Charge d'Affaires met with Fadil Hoxha and had discussed about the political developments that had taken place in the Yugoslav Federation and Kosovo. According to Lik Seiti „Fadil Hoxha had Albanianist feelings. Fadil Hoxha was very concerned about the momentum of the youth, which could not abide and which manifest to a large and open extent love for Albania and Enver Hoxha.”¹⁰⁶ In recent years, illegal movement and progressive forces had managed to strengthen intellectual patriotic feelings towards Albania and the Albanian national culture, to create a nationalist philosophy for the rights of the Albanian people under Yugoslavia, to be free and equal with other peoples and with European civilization. This movement broke all political synchronized conjunctures of the leaders of the two countries. Fadil Hoxha had told Lik

104 AMPJ, year 1962, dossier B/7, no. 723.

105 B. Meta, *op. cit.*, 207-272.

106 AQSH, fondi 14/AP, year 1970-1971, dossier nr. 387/1, 1.

Seiti that “it was hard to hold back the momentum that he was not against love of Enver and against Kosovar youth holding his photo. On the contrary he was the first who loved Enver Hoxha more than anyone else, but this would damage his work. During the war, when the picture of Enver Hoxha had begun to be taken away, he himself had made Enver Hoxha aware of this and had advised the Kosovo Provincial Committee to raise the issue.”¹⁰⁷

Explaining the conversation with Fadil Hoxha, Lik Seiti emphasized that the latter had said that “in case of any aggression against Albania he would personally be a loyal soldier of Enver Hoxha and that Kosovo would never oppose PRA”.¹⁰⁸ According to Lik Seiti „Fadil Hoxha had attempted since the time of Rankovic to win autonomy for Kosovo. This was the reason why he was targeted. Among political opponents of Fadil Hoxha was even Petar Stambolic.”¹⁰⁹

Through its state mechanisms, Albania and its leadership had constantly wanted to understand the relationship between Kosovo leaders and their attitude towards Albania, as well as the policies of Enver Hoxha in relation to Yugoslavia and Tito. In this case, Enver Hoxha required detailed information on Kosovo leaders such as Fadil Hoxha, Veli Deva, Ali Shukriu etc. Thus, according to Lik Seiti, „Fadil Hoxha and Veli Deva are the best, and Xhavit Nimani and Ali Shukriu are different. When Rankovic was in power, Ali Shukriu had stronger positions than Fadil and Veli.”¹¹⁰

To the question of Enver Hoxha, who among the Kosovo leaders were in favor of the great Serbian line of Rankovic, Lik Seiti replied: “There are doubts about Xhavit Nimani and Ali Shukriu. Moreover, Tito has often empowered Ali Shukriu and has given him popularity.”¹¹¹ Ali Shukriu has also been in Albania. He was a man prepared for cabinet positions. At that time he dealt with the economy, especially with Yugoslavia’s relations with the Arab countries.”¹¹²

After Enver Hoxha’s speech at Tropojë, Xhavit Nimani and Ali Shukriu welcomed more than before the Charge d’Affaires of Albania in Belgrade, hinting to a larger degree of affinity. The same attitude carried Ymer Pula, who according to the data from the agencies was a more positive person.¹¹³

To the question of Enver Hoxha on how Nikeziqi was with Albanians, Lik Seiti responded that „we have heard he supports them and that he has given much advice when he was in Kosovo.”¹¹⁴ Fadil Hoxha wanted to know the opinion of Enver Hoxha on the movement of Rezak Shala, who wanted to establish the Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia. „Fadil Hoxha was against such a thing, since he recognized only the People’s Republic of Albania. He was for a complete autonomy of Kosovo. Rezak Shala was a prosecutor, who was fired after trying to create the Republic.”¹¹⁵

Enver Hoxha was concerned whether Fadil Hoxha ask question for his own interest, or on behalf of Yugoslav leaders.

According to Lik Seiti, the Yugoslav leadership knew about these questions, because Fadil Hoxha had put too much emphasis on Tito, when he wanted to show how much he was interested and how he advised us how to continuously love Albania and Enver Hoxha, because the whole nation loves him and that the whole authority of RPSHsë has increased in the world.¹¹⁶

Fadil Hoxha’s desire was that the legacies of both countries get raised into the rank of embassies, although there were great Serbian opponents who did not want such a thing.¹¹⁷

Enver Hoxha was interested whether Fadil said this with conviction or in timid voice. Lik Seiti replied that „about Tito and his line he spoke with enthusiasm. Perhaps he favors Kosovars. About Rankovic he spoke with hatred.”¹¹⁸ To Enver Hoxha’s question whether people love Fadil Hoxha, Lik Seiti responded, „They love him and it seems that they trust him more than any other rogues of his caliber. People speak better about him. Rumors circulate that he was against the move of Albanians outside Yugoslavia.”¹¹⁹

107 Ibid., 1-2.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid., 3.

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid., 6.

114 Ibid., 4.

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid., 5-6.

117 Ibid., 6.

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid., 7.

Enver Hoxha was concerned about the return of Albanians from Turkey. When he learned that 3-4 people had returned, he instructed the Charge d’Affaire to explain to them the policy of the government about the return of migrants to their homes.¹²⁰

Enver Hoxha did not want to give a written response to Fadil Hoxha, although he had written a letter. He gives it to Lik Seiti to memorize it and to respond orally, since he and his friends may be not sure.¹²¹ It was a double answer: one for Fadil and one for Tito, since Fadil was Tito’s man.¹²²

Enver Hoxha ordered Lik Seiti that among other things he should tell Fadil Hoxha these words:

*“Comrade Enver ordered me to bring you his greetings and to congratulate you about your pure patriotic feelings, which are characteristic for the Albanians, either PRA’s citizens, or Kosovo citizens. It was very much touched by your readiness in case of a danger concerning PRA, because your attitude is in continuation of the military traditions of the people of Kosovo.”*¹²³

By comparing estimates during the conversation with what he had written, it appears that the answer was diplomatic. Albanian leadership considers the changes in Kosovo (acquired rights in the matter of language, education, administration, etc.) a victory against the anti-Albanian and Rankovic Serbian and Montenegrin currents. Enver Hoxha supports the stance of Fadil Hoxha to not recognize the creation of a second Albanian Republic, as a right position, and even stated that it would fight with all their strength for another position.¹²⁴

Likewise, Enver Hoxha was of the opinion that one has to work for the establishment of Kosovo’s autonomy, a full autonomy in government, economy, education and culture(,) in preparing the staff and state security etc.¹²⁵

The Albanian government considers that this request is consistent with national policy and in turn is a major national entity, known also by the Yugoslav constitution. With this request they also fight Serb chauvinists.¹²⁶ But this is not all. There were many other rights in other fields that Kosovars should gain.¹²⁷

Enver Hoxha wanted at all costs to keep the relaxation of the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia, because through this form he saw the opportunity to influence in all political developments in Kosovo. Through the exacerbated relations he realized that he could not have any influence with his policy on issues of Kosovo. Therefore, he stated that „In cooperation with Belgrade, the Albanian government would develop Kosovo. It would help Kosovo in all its directions, especially in the development of education, in the preparation of the staff and texts for the University and also for other schools, exchange experiences, visits etc. The Albanian government would gladly meet all Kosovo requirements”.¹²⁸

Regarding relations with the Yugoslav Federation, the higher party leadership saw the two opposite attitudes.

„You can have your view, but in our opinion Tito is anti-Marxist. Yet we tell you that in these conjunctures, would not be bad to support Tito, because he somehow eased your sufferings. This attitude of Tito towards Kosovo Tito, was in our view, not dictated by love, but by the circumstances that were created, in which the question was: either you will be his enemies, or you will be his friends. It is dangerous to him to antagonize you. Therefore, he wants you to be his friends, which is important also in Tito’s fight against supporters of Rankovic.”¹²⁹

Given these circumstances, the Yugoslav leadership sought to develop relations with the Albanian state. It also wanted to show that „socialist Albania changed line and color, that Titist were right in their stance. Albania will not give this political capital to the Yugoslav leadership.”¹³⁰

Relations with the Yugoslav Federation would officially improve. The Albanian government is studying the issue of exchange of ambassadors, but „Yugoslav leadership should know that it had done too bad to PRA, and it should condemn many bad things publicly in order that the road can somehow be cleared from the hurdles that she herself has created for many years.”¹³¹ Discussing the political views of Fadil Hoxha,

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid., 9.

126 Ibid.

127 Ibid., 8.

128 Ibid., 9.

129 Ibid. 10.

130 Ibid., 11.

131 Ibid.

who at this time was leader of Albanians in Yugoslavia and Tito's closest man, Enver Hoxha wanted to understand and be informed on the positions of Fadil Hoxha.

Thus through the analysis of this document, we have the closeness between attitudes of both sides. The union of Kosovo with Albania according to the Albanian leadership would come in other situations. As known, Fadil was against the Republic, although at this time he did not declare that he wished Kosovo to join Albania. Fadil only required full autonomy and in this situation we agree with that.¹³² Both sides had obviously agreed to maintain the status quo and to do what was possible to leave the power and influence over Kosovo. Further in the document it is stated: „The goal is that Serbs should not rule on Kosovo. They should go to their country. Kosovars should rule with the power of law in Kosovo. They should be at the top in all sectors: in power, economy, military and insurance. We should even fight that to put good people, so that when time comes, unity should happen. The point should be, therefore dialectically, that these things do not happen through good wishes.”¹³³

Conclusion

The Albanian state policy in the early 60s was in a difficult situation, especially after the break of the relations with the USSR. Albania was politically isolated and support to the Kosovo issue was more focused on ideological lines. Albania had raised as a political platform within its state institutions tasks to deal with the issue of Kosovo. In this political concept, Enver Hoxha saw the solution of the Kosovo issue in the light of ideological reflections. He counted on a possible coalition of anti-Titoist political forces throughout Yugoslavia. Developments in Kosovo, and repeated requests of the underground movement addressed to Albania asking for her support, pushed the Albanian politics to deal with the issue of Kosovo.

This period is characterized by the intensity of the PLA's relations with Albanian political groups in emigration and within Kosovo. Relations between Albania and Yugoslavia are at this time seen in the light of a relaxed relationship. Enver Hoxha was trying to exploit these new relations to have an influence on the political movement in Kosovo. He criticized the political organization of an underground movement in Kosovo from his ideological position, sending messages about new forms of action and seeking to relinquish slogans such as „War to join Albania.” Enver Hoxha's official stance was consistent with the political position of Kosovo Albanian officials at the federal level by concerning the existence of only one Albanian republic, in this case that of the Republic of Albania. As for the Republic of Kosovo, both parties expressed themselves against the creation of the Second Albanian Republic. Enver Hoxha and the Kosovo leadership had decided their interests versus the interests of the Kosovo issue.

The United States government had carefully followed the reflections of the 1968 demonstrations. Kosovo now entered into a new phase of political, legal, economic, and cultural maturity. The illegal movement revealed itself openly with the demand for a republic. Kosovo institutions supported political position of the Illegal movement in the first phase. Albania was reluctant to the request for the Republic of Kosovo. In the circumstances, it created after the intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia, Albania was more interested to have slow developments regarding Kosovo's legal status in the Yugoslav Federation.

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Thank you for your kind collaboration. *Editor-in-Chief*

132 Ibid., 16

133 Ibid.